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Facilitating Money Judgment Enforcement 
Between Canada and the United States 
JAMES P. GEORGE† 
The United States has attempted for years to create a more efficient enforcement regime for 
foreign-country judgments, both by treaty and statute. Long negotiations succeeded in July 2019, 
when the Hague Conference on Private International Law (with U.S. participants, including the 
Uniform Law Commission) promulgated the new Hague Judgments Convention which 
harmonizes judgment recognition standards but leaves the domestication process to the enforcing 
jurisdiction. In August 2019, the Uniform Law Commission took a significant step to fill that gap, 
though limited to Canadian judgments. The Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments 
Act provides a registration process similar to that for sister-state judgments in the United States. 
The new Act aligns with Canada’s Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, retaining 
due process safeguards while facilitating acceptance of appropriate judgments. In most cases, 
this will avoid the need for further litigation and lead to more efficient enforcement in adopting 
jurisdictions. This Article outlines the new Act and then tackles difficult questions that remain 
subject to local law.  
 
 †  Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. The Author thanks Committee Chair Lisa 
Jacobs and National Conference Reporter Kathy Patchell, and each member of the drafting committee for their 
excellent dialogue and result with the Act. The Author also thanks Kaitlin Wolff and other staff members at the 
Uniform Law Commission, Texas A&M Reference Librarian Cynthia Burress, and administrative assistant 
Andrea Hudson, all of whom contributed significantly to the Act and this Article. The conclusions, opinions, 
and any errors are mine and not those of the Uniform Law Commission, the drafting committee, or the people 
thanked here. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2019, the Uniform Law Commission approved an act that will 
streamline the process to enforce a Canadian money judgment in the United 
States. The Uniform Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act (“2019 
Registration Act”) supplements the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgment 
Recognition Act (“2005 Act”) currently adopted in twenty-six states and 
territories.1 Under the 2005 Act, a party must file a lawsuit in order to seek 
recognition for a foreign judgment, and if granted, it may enforce the foreign 
judgment in the same manner as a judgment rendered locally. The 2019 
Registration Act creates a registration procedure for use with Canadian money 
judgments which does not require the party seeking recognition to file a lawsuit. 
This Article explains the 2019 Registration Act and its relation both to its parent 
Act and to the Canadian counterpart, the Canadian Uniform Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Act.  
This Article deals intricately with those three statutes and incidentally with 
several others, all of which are popularly referred to with acronyms such as 
UFCMJRA. Because of the acronyms’ similarity and the likelihood of 
confusion, I will use shortened forms. There are three United States-based acts, 
all aimed at state adoption: 
• “the 1962 Act” is the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act 
• “the 2005 Act” is the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act 
• “the 2019 Registration Act” is the Uniform Registration of Canadian 
Money Judgments Act  
There are two Canadian acts, adopted in various Canadian provinces and 
territories: 
• “the REJA-C” is the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 
• “the UEFJA-C” is the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act  
Part I discusses the history of these acts.  
In addition, readers must distinguish between a judgment’s recognition (the 
enforcing state’s acceptance of a foreign judgment for preclusion or enforcement 
purposes) and the judgment’s enforcement (execution against local assets). In 
turn, recognition breaks down into recognition standards (such as the judgment 
debtor’s amenability to the rendering state’s jurisdiction) and the initial 
application process in the enforcing state (litigation versus registration). Part II 
discusses the application process—registration—offered by the 2019 
Registration Act.  
Part III discusses the myriad of conflicting issues encountered following 
judgment registration under the 2019 Registration Act or filing under the 2005 
Act. Although judgment execution per se is beyond these Acts’ scope, it is 
 
 1. For a list of enacting jurisdictions, see 2005 Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIF. 
L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=ae280c30-094a-
4d8f-b722-8dcd614a8f3e (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).  
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important that attorneys and courts understand both the distinction and interplay 
of the judgment recognition and the ensuing enforcement process. Part IV 
summarizes the 2019 Registration Act’s contribution and speculates as to the 
viability of registration in other judgment enforcement regimes. 
I.  FOREIGN-COUNTRY JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
A.  THE UNITED STATES 
1.  The Common Law  
As Joseph Story noted in the early nineteenth century, foreign judgment 
recognition has been the subject of “no inconsiderable fluctuation” in the 
common law.2 In chronicling this fluctuation, Story first noted a frequent 
distinction in England between judgments offered for enforcement and those 
offered in defense. Judgments filed for enforcement were treated as prima facie 
evidence of the claim subject to attack for various errors—that is, the claim was 
often relitigated. But judgments offered in defense were analyzed under 
preclusion principles.3 Using that practice as a starting point, Story offered 
several pages of variations ranging from moderations to sharp deviations from 
the English view.4 The United States at that point had insufficient legal history 
to draw conclusions. Story reported only the generality that foreign judgments 
were prima facie evidence but impeachable, and that “how far and to what extent 
this doctrine is to be carried, does not seem to be definitely settled.”5 
The United States Supreme Court took a large step in 1895 to straighten 
the fluctuation in its review of a French judgment. In Hilton v. Guyot,6 the Court 
explained at length that foreign-country judgments are entitled to recognition 
under twin standards of comity and reciprocity. As to comity, the Court stated 
we are satisfied that, where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial 
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon 
regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the 
defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial 
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of 
other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or 
in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the 
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should not 
allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in 
 
 2. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO 
CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, 
SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 603 (Lawbook Exch. 2d ed. 2001) (1841).  
 3. See id. § 598. 
 4. See id. §§ 598–610; see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 180–95 (1895). 
 5. STORY, supra note 2, § 608; see also Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns 157, 169 (N.Y. 1808) and other cases 
and treatises discussed in PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, & CHRISTOPHER A.  
WHYTOCK, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1421–22 (West Acad. Publ’g 6th ed. 2018). 
 6. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113. 
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this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, 
upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law 
or in fact.7 
The Court—and on this second point a bare majority—held further that 
comity required reciprocity, and because France did not give conclusive effect 
to United States judgments, the Court would not recognize the French 
judgment.8 A strong four-justice dissent favored the French judgment, arguing 
that preclusion was the common law mandate here rather than the more 
politically oriented comity, and that reciprocity had no role in the analysis.9 The 
Hilton majority thus held that the question of foreign-country judgment 
recognition was one of public law, conceivably addressable by a national or 
international standard. The Hilton dissent argued for preclusion, a question of 
the common law and thus private law. That question—public law or private 
law—continues to be debated in regard to foreign country judgment recognition.  
The next instance of that ongoing debate came from the New York Court 
of Appeals in 1926. In Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, the 
New York Court of Appeals rejected Hilton’s comity and reciprocity standard, 
and instead followed the Hilton dissent by applying New York’s common law 
of preclusion to the French judgment’s recognition.10 Johnston’s holding made 
two important points. First, the recognition of the French judgment was a 
question of private law based on preclusion, and not public law based on comity. 
Second, because it was a question of private law, it was a state law question 
governed by New York law. 
The state law view was bolstered in 1938 when the Supreme Court decided 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, holding that diversity cases were governed by 
the law of the state in which the federal court sat.11 Although Erie applied only 
to federal courts (and not, for example, to state court actions on foreign-country 
judgments), the doctrine came to stand for something much broader than the 
governing law in diversity cases. For example, in Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia 
Chewing Gum Corp.,12 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals cited Erie in holding 
that Pennsylvania law governed the recognition of an English default 
judgment.13 Interestingly, Pennsylvania’s applicable law was comity, based on 
Hilton, but rejected Hilton’s reciprocity.14 In any event, Erie clarified the 
primacy of state common law even outside of federal litigation, including its 
application to what the Hilton majority assumed was a question of public law 
and national scope. To the extent the Hilton majority purported to announce a 
federal standard for recognizing foreign-country judgments, the combination of 
 
 7. Id. at 202–03. 
 8. Id. at 210. 
 9. Id. at 233–34. 
 10. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 386–88 (1926). 
 11. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). 
 12. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 1017 (1972). 
 13. Id. at 440. 
 14. Id. at 440 & n.8. 
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Johnston and Erie has ended that. Nonetheless, state courts are free to adhere to 
Hilton’s comity and reciprocity standard, and some do.15 On the other hand, state 
law’s current dominance of foreign-country judgment recognition does not mean 
that federal law cannot control the question, but only that in the absence of 
federal law—federal statute or treaty—state law controls. 
2.  The Uniform Acts 
In 1948, the Uniform Law Commission approved the Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (US-UEFJA) to provide clearer 
enforcement of sister-state judgments. Although the US-UEFJA was merely a 
codification of the common law standard under full faith and credit, it expedited 
sister-state judgment enforcement by requiring only a registration rather than a 
new lawsuit. The sister-state Act had sufficient success16 to encourage the 
Uniform Law Commission to consider a similar act for foreign-country 
judgments. 
That happened in 1962 with the promulgation of the Uniform Foreign 
Money Judgment Act (“1962 Act”). As the California Supreme Court noted, 
“[t]he purpose of the uniform act was to codify the most prevalent common law 
rules for recognizing foreign money judgments and thereby encourage the 
reciprocal recognition of United States judgments in other countries.”17 There 
were, of course, a number of differences from the sister-state Act. Notably, first, 
the sister-state Act applies to any judgment entitled to full faith and credit18 but 
the 1962 Act applies only to money judgments other than those for taxes, fines, 
other penalties, or family law judgments.19 Second, the 1962 Act does not allow 
for mere registration of the foreign-country judgment but instead requires 
“recognition” accomplished through a new lawsuit,20 although the 1962 Act 
itself did not make that clear.21 Third, the 1962 Act allows for both preclusion 
 
 15. See HAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 1424–25 & n.305. 
 16. As of 2019, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (U.S.) has been enacted in forty-eight 
states (all but California and Vermont) plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 1964 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/ 
community-home?CommunityKey=e70884d0-db03-414d-b19a-f617bf3e25a3 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).   
 17. Manco Contracting Co. (W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian, 195 P.3d 604, 608 (Cal. 2008) (citing 13 pt. II West’s 
U. Laws Ann. (2002) Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Prefatory Note, p. 40).  
 18. See UNIF. ENF’T OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 1 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1964). 
 19. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1962). 
 20. For sister-state judgments, full faith and credit requires recognition when a qualified judgment is 
registered. Because foreign-country judgments do not qualify for full faith and credit, a summary proceeding is 
necessary.  
 21. The drafters apparently believed that the need to file a new action in the enforcing state was obvious 
since it was required under the common law. That oversight was one of the reasons for the revisions that came 
in 2005 with the Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY 
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6 cmt. 1 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005). In the meantime, states had varying 
reactions to the 1962 Act’s failure to specify a filing requirement. Florida saw it as acceptable to use a registration 
procedure that the drafters did not intend. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.604 (2019). No other state drafted a 
registration procedure as such, but some courts interpreted it that way. See, e.g., Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos, 552 
N.E.2d 1093, 1099–1101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Maxwell Shuman & Co. v. Edwards, 663 S.E.2d 329, 331–32 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2008). A Texas court, on the other hand, held the 1962 Act unconstitutional for its failure to 
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and enforcement.22 Finally, the 1962 Act provides additional defenses and 
protections for the judgment debtor.23 The 1962 Act was eventually adopted by 
thirty-five states and three territories,24 but several have replaced it with the 2005 
Act. As of 2019, ten states and one territory use the 1962 Act—Alaska, 
Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands.25  
The 1962 Act’s failure to provide an express procedure, along with other 
perceived shortcomings, led to an updated Act in 2005. The changes from the 
1962 Act are explained in the 2005 Act’s prefatory note and include clarifying 
(in some cases enlarging) the definitions,26 scope,27 burdens of proof,28 need to 
file a legal action in the enforcing state,29 defenses,30 and the addition of a statute 
of limitations.31 The 2005 Act has been adopted in twenty-six U.S. jurisdictions: 
Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.32 
 
require notice to the judgment debtor. See Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) 
(denying writ of mandamus). As a result, the Texas legislature amended its version of the 1962 Act to specify a 
notice requirement. See Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enterprises, Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex. 
1990). 
 22. Whether the foreign-country judgment is presented for collection or preclusion, it first requires 
recognition as a qualified judgment. For sister-state judgments, recognition is automatic so there is no need for 
a summary proceeding when submitting it for preclusion, which will necessarily be in an existing action. 
Enforcing the sister-state judgment, which usually means collecting a money judgment, requires registration 
under the US-UEFJA in order to give notice to the judgment debtor and to open a domestic cause number. See 
generally UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT. 
 23. In addition to the jurisdictional defenses under the sister-state act, the 1962 Act includes defenses such 
as unfair legal system and public policy violations that are unavailable under the sister state act. See id. § 4.  
 24. HAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 1425. 
 25. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, U.L.A. Refs & Annos (2020). The 
Uniform Laws Annotated reference table lists Delaware and Illinois, but those states also appear on the 2005 
Act reference table and both show current versions of the 2005 Act. 
 26. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 2 (refining the definitions to 
read “foreign country” and “foreign-country judgment”). 
 27. See id. § 3 (clarifying certain exclusions such as domestic relations judgments). 
 28. The judgment creditor or other party seeking recognition bears the initial burden to establish that the 
judgment falls within the Act’s scope. See id. § 3(c). Once that burden is met, the judgment is presumed 
enforceable and the judgment debtor (or other party opposing recognition) bears the burden of establishing a 
basis for nonrecognition. See id. § 4(d).  
 29. See id. § 6. 
 30. See id. §§ 4(c)(7)–(8) (adding discretionary nonrecognition grounds based on the rendering court’s 
integrity and due process violations in foreign proceedings). The best explanation of defense distinctions 
between the 1962 Act and the 2005 Act comes from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in DeJoria v. Maghreb 
Petroleum Exploration, S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 386 (5th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter DeJoria I], rev’d, 935 F.3d 381 (5th 
Cir. 2019) [hereinafter DeJoria II]. In DeJoria II, the judgment debtor successfully opposed a Moroccan 
judgment by lobbying the Texas legislature to adopt the 2005 Act which added crucial defenses. DeJoria, 935 
F.3d at 387–88. 
 31. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 9. 
 32. See 2005 Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, supra note 1. 
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3.  Proposals for a National Standard—Treaty or Unilateral Statute 
As noted above, state law governance of foreign-country judgment 
recognition is not a foregone conclusion. National standards have been 
continuously proposed at least back to Hilton. The most notable effort, which 
may now succeed in the United States, is through the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, which in 1993 began drafting a Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments. The process continued through 
2001, but negotiations reached impasses on jurisdictional bases such as “tag 
jurisdiction” and “general jurisdiction” (doing business in the forum unrelated 
to the claim). When it became clear that no agreement was in sight, the 
negotiators took a fallback position and crafted an agreement on forum clauses 
that became the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.33  
During the Hague negotiations, the American Law Institute (ALI) 
undertook the drafting of a federal statute designed to implement the anticipated 
Hague Judgments Convention. The ALI work began in 1998,34 and when the 
Hague efforts failed, the ALI switched the plan to creating a federal statute that 
would create a federal standard for recognizing foreign-country judgments. 
Controversies during that process included some ALI members’ resistance to a 
federal standard, and other members’ preference for a reciprocity requirement.35 
That work was completed in 2005 with a proposed federal statute that included 
reciprocity,36 but it did not reach Congress. 
Treaty proponents did not give up, and in 2019 the Hague Conference 
finalized the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.37 The Convention states the 
standards for recognition including jurisdiction, defenses, and authentication,38 
but leaves the filing or registration procedure, along with enforcement, up to the 
enforcing state’s law.39 Additionally, the Convention expressly retains the 
enforcing states’ existing recognition and enforcement methods.40 The 
Convention opened for signing on July 2, 2019, but as of this writing only 
Uruguay has signed.41 Ratification in the United States is of course speculative, 
 
 33. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 44 I.L.M. 1294 (2005), https://assets.hcch.net/ 
docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf. The United States has signed but not ratified the 
convention. See Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/ 
conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).  
 34. See Memorandum from Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Professor Linda Silberman to the Council 
of the Am. L. Inst. (Nov. 30, 1998), https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/ed/f9/edf92d0f-e280-4480-b8de-
5aade127c56c/foreign-judgments-memorandum.pdf. 
 35. See Lance Liebman, Foreword to AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE, at xii–xiii (2005). 
 36. See id. at xi–xii.  
 37. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, July 2, 2019, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/806e290e-bbd8-413d-b15e-8e3e1bf1496d.pdf.  
 38. See id. at art. 5 (jurisdictional bases), art. 6 (in rem exclusion), art. 7 (defenses), art. 12 (authentication). 
 39. See id. at art. 13. 
 40. See id. at art. 15. 
 41. See Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/ 
status-table/?cid=137 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).  
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and if ratified, it is not clear what reservations might be imposed. Assuming it is 
ratified in the United States and the implementing statute does not impose 
additional requirements on enforcing states (that would create a federal 
enforcement law), then the Convention appears to be compatible with both 
current recognition and enforcement methods, including common law, the 1962 
Act, the 2005 Act, and (if enacted by states) the 2019 Canadian Judgment 
Registration Act.  
B.  CANADIAN APPROACHES TO FOREIGN-COUNTRY JUDGMENTS 
This review of Canadian law is brief because this Article is about judgment 
enforcement in the United States. The discussion here involves Canadian 
jurisdictions only to the extent of harmonizing United States practice, at least in 
the twenty-six states using the 2005 Act, and hopefully in newly-adopting states. 
Interestingly, Canadian law on foreign-country judgment enforcement is more 
complex than in the United States because Canada has not only the same internal 
border issues, but has also managed to tie into specific treaties with the United 
Kingdom42 and France,43 and has other federal legislation geared to judgment-
enforcement treaties.44 A full summation of the larger Canadian law on foreign-
judgment enforcement would take several pages and is unnecessary in this 
Article about a new act for adoption in the United States. The discussion below 
is limited to Canada’s uniform provincial laws directed to foreign-country 
judgment enforcement. 
1.  Common Law 
Canada’s foreign-judgment enforcement system evolved from common 
law enforcement which prevailed until statutory procedures emerged in the 
twentieth century. As with the doctrinal struggle in the United States, Canadian 
law on foreign-judgment enforcement vacillated between a preclusion-based 
system and a sovereignty-based comity approach that included reciprocity. The 
leading Canadian treatise on the subject explains the theoretical contrast between 
the common law and typical civil law systems: common law enforcement tends 
to be on a case-by-case basis, while many non-common law countries either do 
 
 42. See Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Can.-U.K., Apr. 24, 1984, 1987 Can. T.S. No. 29 (enacted as the Canada-United 
Kingdom Civil and Commercial Judgments Convention Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-30); see also JEAN-GABRIEL 
CASTEL & JANET WALKER, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14.27 (LexisNexis Can. Inc. 6th ed. 2005). 
 43. See Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the French Republic on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Maintenance, Can.-Fr., June 10, 1996, https://www.ulcc.ca/en/annual-meetings/377-1997-
whitehorse-yk/civil-section-documents/1132-convention-between-government-of-canada-and-government-of-
french-republic-1997?showall=1&limitstart=. For an example of adoption in a Canadian province, see The 
Enforcement of Judgments Convention and Consequential Amendments Act, C.C.S.M. c E117 (Can. Man.). See 
also CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.28. 
 44. See CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.29 (discussing Canadian federal statutes directed to 
foreign and international judgments regarding antitrust, foreign trade, oil pollution, and terrorism victims). 
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not recognize foreign judgments at all (requiring re-litigation) or recognize 
judgments from specific reciprocating countries, subject to a few objections.45 
This resembles the contrasting views in the United States as shown in the Hilton 
majority and dissent, and the Hilton dissent’s echo in Johnston.46 
Like jurisdictions in the United States, the results in Canada have been a 
hybrid. The two Canadian statutory-enforcement systems—the REJA-C and the 
UEFJA-C—are based on the common law but differ in their procedures, and 
common law enforcement remains available as an alternative to registration or 
recognition under one of the standardized Canadian acts.47  
2.  The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (REJA-C) 
Statutory procedures began to replace common law enforcement in the 
early twentieth century. The REJA-C, though originally derived from a 1924 
model law, is now a collection of statutes with varying content48 used in most 
Canadian provinces and territories—all but Quebec and Saskatchewan.49 The 
adopted versions are not uniform in sections, wording, or scope.50 According to 
Professor Janet Walker, the REJA-C was originally intended as a catch-all act 
to provide a registration procedure for civil money judgments from reciprocating 
jurisdictions—both Canadian and foreign.51 This is consistent, for example, with 
Alberta’s REJA-C. 52  
The adopted versions in various provinces and territories have naturally 
mutated over the many years, and now New Brunswick applies its REJA-C only 
to foreign-country judgments,53 using other statutes to enforce other Canadian 
judgments. Ontario applies its REJA-C only to Canadian provinces and 
territories,54 presumably leaving judgment creditors from foreign countries to 
use common law enforcement. There are, however, three common features 
among all REJA-C versions: a convenient registration procedure, the option to 
use common law recognition/enforcement, and a stiff reciprocity requirement.  
 
 45. See id. § 14.1.  
 46. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 180–95 (1895); Johnson v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 
242 N.Y. 381, 385 (1926).  
 47. See generally CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, ch.14.  
 48. See id. § 14.24 & n.1. 
 49. Ten Canadian jurisdictions have enacted a version of the REJA-C, labeled as such: Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.A. 2000, c R-6 (Can. Alta.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, 
R.S.M. 1987, c J20 (Can. Man.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. 2014, c 127 (Can. N.B.); 
An Act to Facilitate the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments, R.S.N. 1990, c R-4 (Can. Nfld.); Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c R-1 (Can. N.W.T., Nun.); An Act Respecting the Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Judgments, R.S.N.S. 1989, c 388 (Can. N.S.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgements Act, 
R.S.O. 1990, c R.5 (Can. Ont.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c R-6 (Can. P.E.I.); 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c 189 (Can. Yukon). 
 50. As with uniform acts in the United States, various differences exist between the Canadian jurisdictions’ 
REJA-C adoptions. See CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.24. 
 51. See id.  
 52. See Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.A. 2000, c R-6, § 1 (Can. Alta.); Reciprocating 
Jurisdictions Regulation, Alta. Reg. 344/1985, § 1 (Can. Alta.). 
 53. See Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. 2014, c 127, §§ 1, 3 (Can. N.B.).  
 54. See id. § 1; see also Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, Ont. Reg. 322/92, § 1 (Can. Ont.). 
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The REJA-C is an improvement over the common law with its option for 
registering the foreign judgment instead of having to file a new action and 
endure a summary proceeding.55 The disadvantage is the element of reciprocity, 
and not just the requirement, but the overlay of an administrative process. Under 
the REJA-C, reciprocity is not a question to be determined ad hoc by the 
enforcing court, but instead requires an administrative process in which the 
province’s Lieutenant Governor declares the rendering jurisdiction to be a 
reciprocating jurisdiction.56 Once a U.S. state is designated on a province’s 
reciprocating list, future judgment creditors can benefit, but the list of approved 
U.S. states is small. Alberta, for example, has recognized only Arizona, Idaho, 
Montana, and Washington as eligible reciprocating states.57 The process of 
having the rendering state placed on the reciprocating list is sufficiently difficult 
that many judgment creditors choose the common law recognition, although 
there is no available data to assess how many there are in each province. There 
is evidence, though, of frustration with the process. Some judgment creditors 
have tried to circumvent the reciprocity requirement by first filing in a 
reciprocating province and then seeking intra-Canadian enforcement. The 
REJA-C anticipates this and prohibits the practice. That is, the original rendering 
court must be from a jurisdiction officially recognized as reciprocating.58 
One common feature in the various REJA-Cs is the option of foregoing 
registration (and cumbersome reciprocity) and filing a new action. As with the 
1962 Act and the 2005 Act in the United States, the new action is directed to the 
foreign-country judgment rather than the underlying claim and anticipates 
summary resolution based on preclusion.59  
Two Canadian jurisdictions have not adopted the REJA-C. Quebec—a civil 
code jurisdiction—has drafted code provisions60 based on the 1971 Hague 
Judgments Convention.61 The Quebec code does not impose reciprocity but also 
has no registration option.62 Saskatchewan has adopted the latest version of 
Canada’s Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which offers a 
registration procedure, lacks reciprocity, and is discussed immediately below.  
 
 55. Professor Walker notes that the REJA-C registration process “is more efficient than the common law 
method of enforcement but it can still be cumbersome and expensive.” CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, 
§ 14.24, at 14-103. 
 56. See, e.g., Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.A. 2000, c R-6, § 8 (Can. Alta.); see also 
CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.24 & nn.4–5. In contrast, states in the United States using reciprocity 
treat it as a judicial question and some states make it discretionary. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 36A.004(c)(9) (2019). 
 57. See Reciprocating Jurisdictions Regulation, Alta. Reg. 344/1985, § 1 (Can. Alta.). 
 58. See CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.24 & n.5.  
 59. See id. § 14.24 & n.3. 
 60. See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, arts. 3155–68 (Can.); Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 
2014, c 1, arts. 507–08 (Can.). 
 61. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=78; 
CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.13 & n.3. The 1971 Hague Judgments Convention (ratified only by 
Albania, Cypress, Kuwait, the Netherlands, and Portugal), not to be confused with the 2019 Hague Judgments 
Convention, just opened for signature. 
 62. See CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 42, § 14.3 & n.51. 
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3.  The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA-C) 
The Uniform Law Conference of Canada has long encouraged a 
reciprocity-free procedure for foreign-country judgments. The original model 
came out in 1933 with the Model Foreign Judgments Act, which has been 
revised many times since.63 The earliest versions dropped the reciprocity 
requirement with its cumbersome administrative layer64 but until recently the 
UEFJA-C did not have a registration option like the REJA-C. The Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada (ULC-C) produced the most recent version in 2003 and 
Saskatchewan enacted it in 2005.65 New Brunswick has enacted, in addition to 
its REJA-C, what appears to be a prior version of the UEFJA-C entitled the 
Foreign Judgments Act. The New Brunswick version does not require 
reciprocity but lacks a registration procedure and instead requires a new action 
on the foreign judgment,66 which makes it simply a codification of the common 
law similar to the 2005 Act in the United States.  
The UEFJA-C is a well-structured Act that offers cost-and-time reduction 
while retaining due process concerns. While the REJA-C applies (with some 
exceptions) to judgments rendered outside the enforcing forum, including other 
Canadian jurisdictions,67 the UEFJA-C is limited to judgments from “foreign 
States,” not referring to other Canadian provinces or territories.68 A line-item 
comparison with the REJA-C is not practical because the REJA-C lacks a current 
model-law format and its ten adoptions vary significantly. A few general 
comparisons are possible, though. Compared to the general format for the 
various REJA-Cs, the UEFJA-C has more definitions,69 a more tightly defined 
scope with additional exclusions,70 a different limitations rule,71 a clearer default 
judgment rule,72 discretion to enforce non-monetary judgments,73 an option for 
partial enforcement if parts of the foreign judgment exceed the Act’s scope,74 
more defenses for the judgment debtor,75 a more nuanced burden of proof,76 
precise judgment interest rules,77 and a clearer rule for monetary conversion.78 
Like the REJA-C, the UEFJA-C is structured around a registration process, and 
 
 63. See id. § 14.23 & n.1.  
 64. Compare id. § 14.23, with id. § 14.24. 
 65. The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.S. 2005, c E-9.121 (Sask. Can.). 
 66. Although the New Brunswick Foreign Judgments Act does not expressly authorize an action on a 
foreign judgment, its only function is to regulate such an action. See Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c 
162, §§ 5–6, 8 (N.B. Can.). 
 67. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 68. See Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act § 2 (Unif. L. Conf. Can. 2003) (Can.) (defining 
“foreign judgment”).   
 69. See id. § 2 (providing eight definitions). 
 70. See id. § 3.  
 71. See id. § 5. 
 72. See id. §§ 4(d), 9. 
 73. See id. § 7. 
 74. See id. §§ 6, 12. 
 75. See id. §§ 4, 10. 
 76. See id. § 10. 
 77. See id. § 15. 
 78. See id. § 13. 
November 2020] MONEY JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT 113 
unlike the REJA-C, the UEFJA-C not only abandons the cumbersome 
administrative process regarding the reciprocity list with the Lieutenant 
Governor, but abandons the reciprocity element entirely. The UEFJA-C is one 
of this Article’s three focus acts and its details are outlined in the chart below.79  
C.  THE CANADIAN-U.S. PROJECT TO EXPEDITE CIVIL MONEY JUDGMENT 
ENFORCEMENT 
Vibrant economies benefit from predictable and consistent judgment 
enforcement regimes. This was true when the drafters included the full faith and 
credit clause in the United States Constitution, and it remains true in the twenty-
first century. On the other hand, judgment enforcement is also a local matter 
because of its in rem nature—an action against necessarily local assets. Those 
local interests explain why foreign-country judgment enforcement resists 
standardization. In a federalist system like the United States or even in more 
traditional polities, local customs and policies evolve both judicially and 
legislatively to accommodate those competing national and local interests. 
Finding the balance between them is essential.  
The only universally agreed-upon point in transnational judgment 
enforcement is that the rendering forum must have jurisdiction over the 
defendant/judgment debtor.80 For interstate judgment enforcement in the United 
States, the full faith and credit clause resolved recognition disparities and 
compelled common law enforcement through summary actions. Building on 
that, the Uniform Law Commission’s UEFJA increased sister-state enforcement 
efficiency by replacing the summary legal action with a registration system.81  
Judgments from foreign countries are a different matter because of inherent 
distrust of foreign legal systems. But arguments against greater efficiencies—
such as registration—fade for judgments from countries with similar legal 
traditions. Canada and the United States are ideal matches, and at its January 
2017 meeting, the Uniform Law Commission approved a joint project with the 
Uniform Law Conference of Canada to draft an act harmonizing the 2005 Act 
and the UEJFA-C.82 The stated goal was a registration procedure for United 
States jurisdictions that would match that in Canada and create a more efficient 
 
 79. See infra Part II.A. 
 80. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 471 (3d ed. 2005) 
(citing, inter alia, ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE (C. Platto & W.G. Horton eds., 2d ed. 
1993)). Even with United States jurisdictions using the 2005 Act, the approach varies. Although the 2005 Act 
calls for the filing of a new legal action in the enforcing state, some states routinely allow registration. See, e.g., 
CE Design Ltd. v. HealthCraft Prods., Inc., 79 N.E.3d 325, 329–30 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). In other states requiring 
a recognition action, courts sometimes allow registration anyway. See, e.g., Hyundai Sec. Co. v. Lee, 155 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 678, 682–84 (Ct. App. 2013). Nonetheless, judgment registration has not taken hold with foreign-
country judgments. 
 81. See, for example, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (2019), the Texas version of the 1964 
Act. Cross border judgment recognition is controversial enough that even sister-state judgment enforcement was 
not always efficient or consistent. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Unif. L. Comm’n, Minutes: Midyear Meeting of the Executive Committee 7 (Jan. 14, 2017), 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=2164ce2
7-3552-7548-25a2-457abf438c12. 
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domestication of civil money judgments between the two countries.83 The joint 
drafting committee had its first meeting in October 2017, and two years later 
presented its proposed final act at the 2019 Annual Meeting in Anchorage, 
Alaska. On July 17, 2019, the Uniform Law Commission approved the Uniform 
Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act and forwarded it to the states 
for enactment.84 
II.  THE UNIFORM REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN JUDGMENTS ACT 
The 2019 Registration Act’s purpose is to harmonize the 2005 Act with the 
UEFJA-C for civil money judgment enforcement in the adopting jurisdictions in 
Canada and the United States. Because the 2019 Registration Act is a drop-in 
amendment to the 2005 Act, there is a fair bit of necessary parallel in the two 
U.S. Acts. But to accomplish the harmonization between U.S. and Canadian law, 
the 2019 Registration Act varies from the 2005 Act on key points. The chart 
below lists the similarities and distinctions in the three acts. The summaries’ 
points here are paraphrased and the full text, without comments, is attached as 
Appendix B. The 2019 Registration Act’s text with comments is available on 
the Uniform Law Commission website.85  
A.  THREE ACTS COMPARED 
Following is a side-by-side comparison of the 2005 Act, the UEFJA-C, and 
the 2019 Registration Act. The 2019 Registration Act is intended to harmonize 
the 2005 Act and the UEFJA-C.  
  
 
 83. See id.  
 84. See Unif. L. Comm’n, Transcript of the Proceedings, 2019 Annual Meeting of the Uniform Law 
Commission, Tenth Session, Wednesday, July 17, 2019, at 302–10 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2019) (on file with 
author and Unif. L. Cmm’n).  
 85. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).  
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2019 Reg Act  
(U.S.) 
Basic Provisions 













state of origin 
§ 2 Terms defined: 
Canada  
Canadian judgment 
Consistent with the 




§ 3(a) limits scope to 
foreign-country 
judgments to the extent 
they (1) grant or deny 
recovery for a sum of 
money, and (2) are final, 
conclusive and 
enforceable under the 
law of the rendering 
state. § 3(b) excludes:  
tax judgments 
fines or penalties 
domestic relations 
Applies to foreign 
judgments as defined 
in § 2. § 3 excludes: 







country fines or 
penalties judgments 
predating this Act 
§ 3.1 covers foreign 
civil protection orders. 
§ 6.1(3)—money 
damages includes an 
award by rendering 
court of costs/ 
expenses of litigation 
§ 3(a) incorporates the 
2005 Act’s scope 
because the 
Registration Act is a 
drop-in for the 2005 
Act. However, § 2(2) 
tracks the UEJFA-C by 
barring chain 
registration/recognition 
(for example, it limits 
judgments to those 
litigated in Canada). 
Comment 1 to § 3 
discusses the 
Registration Act’s 
position on bankruptcy 
but is unchanged from 





Applies to default 
judgments without 
expressly so stating. 
§ 4(c)(6) provides a 
discretionary non-
recognition ground for 
judgments based only on 
personal jurisdiction 
which includes, but is 
not necessarily limited 
to, defaults. The 
judgment debtor may 
object if notice in the 
rendering state was not 
made in sufficient time 
to prepare a defense. See 
§ 4 comment 7. 
Yes. § 4(d) excludes 
only default 
judgments where 
notice was not 
received in sufficient 
time to present a 
defense. § 9 adds a 
jurisdictional nexus 




(burden of proof on 
judgment debtor 
(§ 10)). 
Applies to default 
judgments without 
expressly so stating, 





No. Limited by its terms 
to money judgments. 
Yes. § 7 gives the 
enforcing court 
discretion to enforce a 
non-monetary award 
and modify it if 
necessary. 
No, consistent with the 
2005 Act’s limit to 
money judgments.  
 
5 Partial Yes. § 3 provides that Yes. § 6(1) provides a Yes. § 3(c) expressly 
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enforcement 
option 
the Act applies to a 
foreign-country 
judgment to the extent 
it’s within the Act’s 
scope and does not 
apply to the extent it 
falls within an excluded 
category. The enforcing 
court is free to recognize 
and enforce the out-of-
scope aspects under 
common law or comity. 
See § 3 comments 2 & 
5. 
court can reduce 
award for punitive 
damages, etc., to the 
extent they would be 
available in enforcing 
state. § 6(2) provides a 
court may reduce 
excessive actual 
damages, limiting to 
what the enforcing 
court could award. 
§ 12(2) provides a 
judgment creditor may 
register only part of 
foreign judgment. 
§ 12(4)(c) provides a 
creditor may seek 








No. Judgment creditors 
must file a new lawsuit 
or raised by 
counterclaim, 
crossclaim, etc. See § 6. 
Yes. § 12. Yes. § 4, and to some 
extent, the entire Act is 
about the use of 
registration as a drop-




Yes. § 7(1) provides for 
recognition for 
preclusion purposes and 
§ 7(2) provides for 
enforcement as a local 
judgment. 
Yes. § 11 provides for 
recognition for 
preclusion purposes 
under the same terms 
for enforcement. 
No, but § 9 allows the 
alternative of filing a 
recognition action 
under the 2005 Act. 
8 Litigation 
option 
Yes, exclusive process, 
and § 11 preserves the 
common law action. 
No express provision. 
But contract with § 3.1 
allowing judgment 
creditor to proceed 
under another Act 
(UECJDA). 
No, but § 9 allows 
filing a recognition 
action under the 2005 
Act. As a result, the 
Registration Act can 
only be used for 




No express provision. 
Enforcing state’s 
evidentiary laws on 
authentication govern, 
which may in turn look 
to rendering state’s law. 
Yes. § 12(4)(a) 
requires a copy of the 
foreign judgment 
certified by proper 
officer of the 
rendering court. 
Yes. § 4(b)(1) is based 
on the UEFJA-C 
§ 12(4)(a). 
10 Translation No express provision; 
presumably governed by 
enforcing state’s law. 
Yes. § 12(4)(d). Yes. § 4(b)(10). 




No express provision. 
But § 6 (which requires 
the filing of a new 
action) would require 
notice under enforcing 
state’s law.  
§ 12(3) requires notice 
to judgment debtor of 
intent to register the 
foreign judgment. 
Yes. § 6 requires 
notice of registration in 
the same manner as 




§ 9 provides the earlier 
of (1) time allowed by 
§ 5 provides the 
earlier of (1) time 
No change from the 
2005 Act. See § 7. 
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rendering state, or (2) 15 
years after date the 
judgment became 
effective in the 
rendering state. 
allowed by rendering 
state, or (2) 10 years 
after date the 
judgment became 
enforceable in the 
rendering state. 
13 Act defines 
enforcing 
court 
No express provision; 
presumably must be 
filed in a court having 
subject matter 
jurisdiction. See § 6. 
Yes. § 2 provides “the 
superior court of 
unlimited trial 
jurisdiction in the 
enacting province or 
territory.” 
No change from the 
2005 Act. See § 4(a). 
Defenses 




§ 4 provides two-tiers of 
defenses: mandatory and 
discretionary. § 4(b) is 
mandatory and bars 
recognition for lack of: 
impartial tribunal or 
reasonable procedural 
opportunities (must be 
systemic), personal 
jurisdiction, and subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
§ 4(c) provides 
discretionary non-
recognition for: lack of 
notice in time to prepare 
a defense extrinsic fraud  
public policy conflict 
with a final and 
conclusive judgment  
conflict with a forum 
clause derogating from 
the rendering forum’s 
jurisdiction inconvenient 
forum (for judgments 
based only on personal 
jurisdiction) substantial 
doubts about rendering 
court’s integrity due 
process. § 5 defines non-
exclusive bases for 
personal jurisdiction:  





prior to case 
commencement, 
human domicile, or 
corporate presence 
(incorporation/formation 
or principal place of 
business) in the 
rendering state business 
presence in the 
rendering forum related 
§ 4 provides a foreign 
judgment cannot be 
enforced if the: 
rendering court lacked 
personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction as 
defined in § 8 & § 9 
judgment has been 
satisfied judgment is 
unenforceable in the 
rendering state, or 
appeal is pending, or 
time for appeal 
expired not properly 
served under the 
rendering state’s law, 
or did not receive 
notice in sufficient 
time to present a 
defense, and the 
judgment was allowed 
by default judgment 
was obtained by fraud 
lack of procedural 
fairness and natural 
justice in the rendering 
state judgment is 
manifestly contrary to 
the enforcing state’s 
public policy a parallel 
case in the enforcing 
state that began before 
the case seeking 
enforcement, or has 
resulted in another 
judgment or order in 
the enforcing state, or 
has been reduced to 
judgment in foreign 
state other than the 
rendering state. § 10 
states a foreign 
judgment may not be 
enforced if the 
judgment debtor 
shows a lack of real 
No change from the 
2005 Act. See § 7. The 
2019 Act incorporates 
by reference all 
defensive grounds in 
the 2005 Act. See 
§ 7(b) and comment 2. 
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to the judgment vehicle/ 
aircraft operation in the 
rendering forum related 
to the judgment. In 
addition to defenses in 
§ 4 & § 5, there are 
other primary defenses 
such as falling outside 
the Act’s scope. 
and substantial 
connection with the 
rendering state AND 
that jurisdiction was 
inappropriate there. 
15 Burden § 3(c) places the burden 
on the party seeking 
recognition to file a new 
lawsuit and obtain a 
local judgment based on 
preclusion. Once filed, 
§ 4(d) places a burden of 
raising and proving 
defenses on the 
judgment debtor. 
§ 10 places the burden 
on judgment debtor to 
establish the defenses of 




defense sections, § 4 
(reasons for refusal), § 8 
(personal jurisdiction), 
§ 9 (real and substantial 
connection) do not 
specify. 
§ 7. Once an 
authenticated foreign 
judgment is registered 
under § 4 and notice 
given under § 5, the 
burden is on the 
judgment debtor to 
establish a defense 
under § 7. Failing that, 
the registration results 
in a local judgment 
capable of 
enforcement.  
16 Stay  Yes. § 8 places the 
burden on the judgment 
debtor to show the case 
is on appeal or that one 
will be taken; the court 
may issue a stay until 
the appeal concludes, 
time for appeal expires, 
or defendant has failed 
to prosecute the appeal. 
§ 4(c) provides a 
defense to 
enforcement if on 
appeal, or time for 
filing appeal has not 
run. 
Yes. § 8 provides that 
after filing a § 7 
petition to set aside the 
registration, a party 
may request a stay 
which can be granted 
upon a showing of 
likelihood of success 
on the merits. The 
court may require 
security.  
Outcome 
17 Effect of 
filing 
There is no registration 
procedure. The judgment 
creditor files a new 
lawsuit, gives notice to 
the judgment debtor, then 
moves for summary 
judgment unless the 
judgment debtor pleads a 
defense. If judgment 
creditor prevails, the 
foreign judgment is 
domesticated and 
enforceable locally. 
The filing of a 
properly attested 
foreign judgment 
leads to registration, 
notice to the judgment 
debtor, and 
enforcement under the 
enforcing 
jurisdiction’s law 
unless the judgment 
debtor successfully 
raises a defense. 
Same as the UEFJA-C. 
The filing of a properly 
attested foreign 
judgment leads to 
registration, notice to 
the judgment debtor, 
and enforcement under 
the enforcing forum’s 
law unless the 
judgment debtor 
successfully raises a 
defense. 
18 Enforcement § 7(2) provides 




judgment or trial. 
§ 14 provides 
registered judgment is 
enforceable 30 days 
after filing as if it were 
local judgment so long 
as no successful 
defenses. 
§ 7 provides the same 
result as under the 
UEFJA-C.  
  
19 Costs No express provision; 
presumably governed by 
enforcing state’s law. 
Yes. Under § 12(5), a 
judgment creditor 
may, if the regulations 
provide, recover the 
Yes. § 4(b)(6)(B) 
requires listing of 
Canadian costs.  
§ 4(b)(7) requires listing 
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costs and expenses 
related to the 
registration of the 
foreign judgment.  
of post-judgment costs 
up to the date of 
registration; no mention 
of enforcing state costs, 
presumably governed by 
enforcing state’s law. 
20 Interest No express provision; 
presumably governed by 
enforcing state’s law. 
Yes. § 15 is governed 
by the rendering 
state’s law up to date 
of currency 
conversion and 
thereafter by the 
enforcing state’s law. 
Court has discretion to 
change the rate or 
calculation 
methodology if the 
judgment creditor 
would be under- or 
over-compensated. 
§ 4(b)(6)(A) requires 
listing in the 
registration the rate 
and accrual of interest 
awarded by the 
rendering court; does 
not mention the cutoff 
date when Canadian 
law no longer governs, 
or the effect of the 






No express provision; 
presumably governed by 
the enforcing state’s 
law. 
Yes. § 13 requires 
judgment creditor’s 
statement that the 
judgment will be 
converted to local 
currency on the 
conversion date; the 
conversion date is the 
last day, before the 
day on which the 
judgment debtor 
makes a payment to 
the judgment creditor 
under the registered 
foreign judgment, on 
which the bank quotes 
a Canadian dollar 
equivalent to the other 
currency. 
No mention, same as 
2005 Act. See § 4 
Comment 11, which 
notes the intent to track 
the 2005 Act on this 
point.  
 
As the chart shows, the 2019 Registration Act follows its parent Act—the 
2005 Act—on such fundamental points as definitions, scope, defenses, and 
several of the issues left to the enforcing state’s law. On the other hand, the 
Registration Act accomplishes its harmonization task with key sections on the 
filing procedure (registration rather than a new legal action), notice, the 
expedited effect, changes in the stay provision, the petition to set aside, and the 
provisional remedies available upon registration. 
B.  A DRY RUN THROUGH REGISTERING AND OBJECTING 
The chart above and this brief synopsis are paraphrases of the Act’s 
elements. For a thorough understanding of the 2019 Registration Act, read its 
text in Appendix B or better still, read the Act and comments at the Uniform 
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Law Commission website.86 The few case citations in this Subpart are of course 
for enforcement under the 2005 Act or the 1962 Act, and not the 2019 
Registration Act which is just now being sent to the states. 
1.  Filing 
a.  Compliance  
Although some cases hold that substantial compliance with filing 
requirements is enough,87 certain elements are no doubt necessary for any court. 
One is a copy of the foreign-country judgment authenticated by the rendering 
court.88 As to other requirements, the 2019 Registration Act includes a form as 
an appendix to Section 4.89 The form is not required when filing, but its use 
makes acceptance more likely in states adopting the 2019 Act substantially 
intact. 
b.  Who May File 
The named judgment creditor of course may file. The 2019 Act also 
contemplates that the judgment creditor’s assignees or successors may file.90 
What about the judgment creditor’s status in the enforcing state? In a New York 
case under the 1962 Act, a judgment debtor objected that the judgment creditor 
was neither present in nor registered to do business in the enforcing state. The 
court held that the state’s corporate registration requirement did not apply to 
parties using the court to enforce a foreign judgment.91 
c.  No Chain Recognition 
A judgment creditor may not use the 2019 Registration Act to register a 
Canadian judgment that merely recognized or domesticated another judgment.92 
The Canadian judgment must be original, one that was litigated in the rendering 
court. This is consistent with the UEFJA-C and the drafting committee thought 
it essential for harmonization.93  
 
 86. See id.; see also id., Prefatory Note at 4–5. 
 87. See Frymer v. Brettschneider, 696 So. 2d 1266, 1267–68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (decided under 
1962 Act). 
 88. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(1); see also Ningbo FTZ 
Sanbang Indus. Co. v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 338 F. App’x 415, 417 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding district court’s 
dismissal for failure to state a claim because the judgment creditor did not produce an authenticated copy of the 
Chinese judgment) (decided under 1962 Act). 
 89. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(d). 
 90. See id. § 4(b)(3). 
 91. See Gemstar Can., Inc. v. George A. Fuller Co., 6 N.Y.S.3d 552, 554 (App. Div. 2015) (decided under 
1962 Act). 
 92. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 2(2). 
 93. See Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act §3(d) (Unif. L. Conf. Can. 2003) (Can.). 
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d.  What to Seek  
Judgment creditors are limited to the monetary amount stated in the 
rendering court’s final judgment, minus payments, plus allowable costs.94 
Currency conversion is not addressed in the 2019 Registration Act but is 
mentioned in a comment, which notes that conversion will be handled under the 
enforcing state’s law, as in the 2005 Act.95 What if there is a delay because of 
appeal in the rendering forum, and the converted amount changes because of 
drastic currency fluctuations? There are no cases on point, but it is likely that 
any change other than appropriate conversion would amount to re-litigation and 
therefore be inappropriate.96  
e.  Limitations 
The 2019 Registration Act defers to the 2005 Act for filing limitations.97 
The 2005 Act requires that the judgment be filed within the earlier of the time 
during which the foreign-country judgment is effective in the foreign country or 
fifteen years from the date that the foreign-country judgment became effective 
in the foreign country.98 The limitations rule in the 2005 Act (and incorporated 
into the 2019 Registration Act) applies to the filing period in the enforcing state. 
Any issue of limitations in the rendering forum would have to be raised there 
and cannot be relitigated in the enforcing forum.99 
f.  Alternate Procedures 
Section 9 of the 2019 Registration Act gives judgment creditors the option 
of registering an appropriate Canadian judgment, or seeking recognition under 
the 2005 Act by filing a legal action.100 Either is available, but not both.101 For 
judgments (or portions of judgments) not within the 2019 Registration Act’s 
scope, judgment creditors may seek recognition under another recognition 
statute or the common law.102 
2.  Notice 
The 2019 Registration Act has a detailed notice provision. This differs from 
the 2005 Act, which has no notice provision but instead requires the filing of a 
new recognition action under the enforcing state’s law, which implicitly requires 
 
 94. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(6)–(8). 
 95. See id. § 4 cmt. 11. 
 96. See Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, 881 F.3d 213, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (filing a petition to enforce 
arbitration rather than an action under the 1962 or 2005 Acts; holding that the award had to be converted under 
current exchange rates and any other approach was relitigation). 
 97. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 7(b)(1); id. cmt. 3. 
 98. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 9 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005). 
 99. See Manco Contracting Co. (W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian, 195 P.3d 604, 612–16 (Cal. 2008) (explaining the 
functions of the limitations period in the rendering forum and the enforcing forum). 
 100. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 9(b). 
 101. See id. § 9(c). 
 102. See id. § 9 cmt. 5. 
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use of the enforcing state’s notice rules.103 Because the 2019 Act speeds up 
enforcement unless objections are raised, the notice requirements are crucial, 
and the 2019 Act specifies both the manner of service and the notice’s content.  
a.  Manner of Service  
The 2019 Act requires the registering party to “cause notice of registration 
to be served on the person against whom the judgment has been registered.”104 
The notice must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint is 
served under the enforcing state’s version of the 2005 Act.105  
b.  Content 
The notice of registration must include (paraphrased here): (1) the 
registration date and court identity; (2) the docket number; (3) the registering 
person’s name and address (and attorney, if any); (4) a copy of the registration 
including the documents required under Section 4(b); and (5) a statement 
advising the person against whom the judgment was registered that they have 
thirty days to petition the court with objections, and that the court may shorten 
or lengthen the thirty-day period.106  
After service, the judgment debtor (or person against whom the judgment 
is registered) has thirty days to file objections or seek a stay. Failing that, the 
Canadian judgment becomes domesticated and immediately enforceable. This is 
a crucial distinction from the 2005 Act where the judgment debtor has not only 
answer time, but the additional time required for a summary proceeding. 
Because of notice’s link to the thirty-day period and domestication, it is likely 
that enforcing courts will strictly observe the details required in 2019 Act notice. 
3.  The Thirty-Day Grace Period and Provisional Remedies 
Under Section 5 of the 2019 Registration Act, successful notice filed with 
the clerk triggers a thirty-day grace period during which the judgment “may not 
be enforced by sale or other property disposition of property, or by seizure of 
property or garnishment.”107 The thirty-day imposed period is another 
distinction from the 2005 Act which has implicit non-enforcement periods 
(answer time, summary judgment procedure, possibly discovery) during the 
required summary proceeding. The thirty-day period may be shortened or 
extended.108 During the grace period, the judgment creditor may use provisional 
 
 103. See  UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6 (requiring the filing of a 
new action); id. cmt. 4. 
 104. UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6(a). 
 105. Id. § 6(b). If the enforcing state has amended its 2005 Act to add a notice section, that section controls. 
If not, then the enforcing state’s basic notice law controls. See id. 
 106. See id. § 6(c). 
 107. See id. § 5(b). 
 108. See id.  
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remedies, such as judgment liens or injunction (to the extent available under 
local law), to prevent asset dissipation.109 
4.  The Judgment Debtor’s Defenses 
The 2019 Registration Act incorporates the defenses from the 2005 Act.110 
In 2005 Act lawsuits, the defenses are raised in an Answer or Motion to Dismiss. 
If the judgment debtor fails to object, the judgment creditor must file a summary 
judgment motion or seek another resolution to obtain judgment. This more 
structured procedure changes with the 2019 Registration Act, where the 
Canadian judgment is registered and becomes final and domesticated as a matter 
of course in thirty days if the judgment debtor fails to raise objections as outlined 
below. There is no need for summary resolution. The enforcing court’s only 
function is to ensure that proper registration procedure is followed, to resolve 
any interlocutory motions, and to adjudicate any defenses. If there are no 
defenses, enforcement follows. 
  a.  The Petition to Vacate Registration  
The judgment debtor may invoke defenses by filing a Petition to Vacate 
Registration within thirty days of receiving notice.111 For enforcement under the 
2005 Act, these defenses would have been raised in an Answer or Motion to 
Vacate, or dismissal for failure to state a claim in federal court.112 The defenses 
are limited to the grounds stated in the 2005 Act, or noncompliance with the 
filing requirements in the 2019 Registration Act.113 
b.  Defenses to Registration 
The 2005 Act provides three mandatory and eight discretionary dismissal 
grounds, recited here because they apply to the 2019 Registration Act. The 
mandatory and discretionary dismissal grounds are discussed further below as 
indicated in the footnotes. The mandatory rejection grounds are that the 
rendering forum (1) was part of a judicial system “that does not provide impartial 
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of 
law;”114 (2) lacked personal jurisdiction;115 or (3) lacked subject matter 
 
 109. See id. § 5(b); id. cmt. 3. 
 110. See id. § 7(b)(1). 
 111. See id. § 7(a). The term “petition” is bracketed and may be replaced in adopting states by “motion” or 
other appropriate term. See id. 
 112. Federal courts can get picky about the defense procedure used under the 2005 Act. See DeJoria v. 
Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 935 F.3d 381, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2019) (admonishing the judgment debtor for 
using a “motion for nonrecognition” instead of summary judgment or a bench trial). But see LMS Commodities 
DMCC v. Libyan Foreign Bank, No. 1:18-CV-679-RP, 2019 WL 1925499, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2019) 
(dismissing the filing of a non-final judgment and using Federal Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim)). 
 113. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 7(b)(1)–(2). 
 114. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(1) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005), discussed infra 
Part III.C.1. 
 115. Id. § 4(b)(2), discussed infra Part III.B.1(a).  
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jurisdiction.116 The eight discretionary grounds are: (1) lack of notice in time to 
prepare a defense in the rendering court;117 (2) extrinsic fraud;118 (3) the 
judgment or claim is repugnant to the enforcing courts or U.S. public policy;119 
(4) conflict with another final and conclusive judgment;120 (5) violation of a 
mandatory forum clause;121 (6) inconvenient forum (limited to cases with 
jurisdiction based only on personal service);122 (7) the rendering court’s lack of 
integrity with respect to the judgment;123 or (8) due process violations.124 The 
2005 Act also provides other defenses such as being outside the scope125 or 
exceeding the limitations period.126 Under the 2019 Registration Act, yet another 
defense is noncompliance with registration requirements.127 
c.  Do Not Lie 
In raising these defenses, do not assume that the rendering court’s 
remoteness enables you to misrepresent what happened. In Moersch v. 
Zahedi,128 the judgment debtor filed an affidavit attesting that he was not served 
and did not participate in the Luxembourg trial. The enforcing court found 
contrary evidence in the Luxembourg court record. The ease of access to 
Canadian court records will make honesty all the more essential under the 2019 
Registration Act. 
d.  Stays 
  For judgment debtors with grounds to object, the thirty-day grace period 
may not be long enough to resolve those objections. Even so, a stay beyond the 
thirty-day period is not automatic—the judgment debtor or resisting party must 
request it, and must do so within the thirty-day grace period following notice.129 
In addition, the stay-seeking party must (1) have filed a Petition to Vacate 
Registration and (2) show a likelihood of success on the merits of the objections 
 
 116. Id. § 4(b)(3), discussed infra Part III.B.1(b). 
 117. Id. § 4(c)(1), discussed infra Part III.C.2. 
 118. Id. § 4(c)(2), discussed infra Part III.C.2. 
 119. Id. § 4(c)(3), discussed infra Part III.C.2. 
 120. Id. § 4(c)(4), discussed infra Part III.C.2. 
 121. Id. § 4(c)(5), discussed infra Part III.C.2. 
 122. Id. § 4(c)(6), discussed infra Part III.C.2. 
 123. Id. § 4(c)(7), discussed infra Part III.C.2. 
 124. See id. § 4(c)(8), discussed infra Part III.C.2. 
 125. See, e.g., LMS Commodities DMCC v. Libyan Foreign Bank, No. 1:18-CV-679-RP, 2019 WL 
1925499, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2019). The judgment creditor sought to enforce Tunisian judgment that was 
in fact an asset freeze order and not a final judgment. Id. 
 126. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 9. 
 127. Under the 2005 Act, the filing requirements are those governing the filing of a new action under the 
enforcing state’s law. See id. § 6. This changes under the 2019 Registration Act where the filing requirements 
are the registration provisions in sections 4 and 6. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS 
ACT §§ 4, 6 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).   
 128. Moersch v. Zahedi, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1084–85 (C.D. Cal. 2017). 
 129. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 8. 
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(not the merits originally litigated). The court may require security for the 
stay.130 
e.  Offsets or Counterclaims 
The 2019 Registration Act covers only Canadian judgment registration and 
does not address offsets or counterclaims. For recognition actions under the 2005 
Act, a judgment debtor could assert an opposing claim or offset because the 
recognition action is a lawsuit, albeit one seeking summary adjudication. For 
that sort of action under the 2005 Act, the opposing claim would have to be 
permissive because compulsory (that is, related) claims would be merged with 
the final judgment being recognized.131 Even though the permissive claim might 
be allowable in a 2005 Act action, it should not be allowed in a 2019 Registration 
Act procedure because there is no lawsuit. 
f.  Relitigating the Merits 
It is a widely accepted rule for judgment preclusion and enforcement that 
a party cannot relitigate the merits of a properly rendered claim. The 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments makes the basic point in regard to 
preclusion generally: “No principle of law is more firmly settled than that the 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it stands in full force 
and is unreversed, cannot be impeached in any collateral proceeding on account 
of mere errors or irregularities, not going to the jurisdiction.”132 The Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments cites several cases in support, quoting the oldest: “Where 
a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which occurs in 
the cause; and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, until 
reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court.”133 The Restatement 
(Second) Conflict of Laws makes the same point in regard to a judgment’s 
extraterritorial effect.134 As a California court recently noted, the judgment 
debtor should have raised the issue of damage caps during the Canadian 
litigation and may not litigate that issue in the enforcing state, which can look 
only to enforcing the rendering jurisdiction’s final judgment.135  
 
 130. See id. § 5(b). 
 131. See Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that compulsory 
counterclaims may not be raised in enforcing forum because that amounts to relitigation) (decided under 1962 
Act). 
 132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17, at 151 (AM. L. INST. 1982) (Reporter’s Note on 
comment d) (quoting 1 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 271 (2d ed. 
1902)).  
 133. Id. (quoting Elliott v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828)). 
 134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 106 (AM. L. INST. 1971) (explaining that judgment 
will be enforced in spite of error of fact or law) (citing MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 52 A. 982 (N.H. 
1902) (holding that Canadian judgment for defendant had preclusive effect in plaintiff’s subsequent lawsuit in 
the United States)); see also id. § 98 cmt. b (detailing how the rationale is the need for an end to litigation). 
 135. See Silver Star Alpine Meadows Dev. Ltd. v. Quinlan, No. A145358, 2016 WL 6649201, at *4 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2016); see also Batbrothers LLC v. Paushok, 101 N.Y.S.3d 297, 298 (App. Div. 2019) 
(decided under 1962 Act); UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6 cmt. 3 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 
2005); UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 7 cmt. 5 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).  
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g.  Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is the concept that the enforcing state will refuse recognition 
of a judgment from a foreign country that does not in turn recognize the 
enforcing state’s judgments. It was the basis for the holding in Hilton,136 is used 
in Canada’s REJA,137 is an element of the American Law Institute proposal,138 
and has been incorporated into some states’ adoptions of the 1962 Act or the 
2005 Act.139 It is not, however, in the Uniform version of the 1962 Act or the 
2005 Act, is not in Canada’s UEFJA-C, and is not in the new 2019 Registration 
Act. The drafters of both the 1962 Act and the 2005 Act believed that judgment 
enforcement was best served by (1) clarifying the recognition standards and (2) 
omitting reciprocity.140 With the 2019 Registration Act, the goal of judgment 
facilitation is even further served in aligning with Canada’s UEFJA-C. 
Currently, only Saskatchewan has enacted the newest UEFJA-C, and one of the 
purposes of the 2019 Registration Act was to assure Canadian jurisdictions of a 
more open approach to properly presented judgments. To the extent that states 
adopting the 2005 Act have added a reciprocity requirement, it will appear in the 
list of defenses as it does with the Texas adoption, and will carry over to 
registrations under the 2019 Registration Act. Although that inclusion does not 
entirely thwart the 2019 Registration Act’s purpose, it is inconsistent. It will be 
best if adopting states reconsider reciprocity in assessing the 2019 Registration 
Act. 
5.  Costs and Attorney Fees  
Unlike the 2005 Act, which defers to the enforcing state’s law, the 2019 
Registration Act addresses costs and attorney fees in both the rendering forum 
and the enforcing forum. When registering the Canadian judgment, the judgment 
creditor lists the costs awarded by the rendering court,141 the attorney fees,142 
and the post-judgment costs and fees incurred during enforcement up to the point 
of registration.143 If only part of the Canadian judgment is being registered, the 
judgment creditor must allocate the costs and fees attributable to the registered 
portion.144  
 
 136. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 139. See, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1004–06 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(citing former TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §36.005(b)(7) (2017)) (decided under 1962 Act). In 2017, 
Texas adopted the 2005 Act and again included a reciprocity provision. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 36A.004(c)(9) (2019). 
 140. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory Note at 1 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005). 
 141. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(6)(B) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).  
 142. See id. § 4(b)(6)(C). 
 143. See id. § 4(b)(7). 
 144. See id. § 4(b)(6), (9). 
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6.  Appeals 
For 2005 Act enforcements, any issue going to the merits of the underlying 
claim must be appealed in the rendering jurisdiction.145 Consistently, under the 
2019 Registration Act, issues on the merits must be appealed in the rendering 
Canadian jurisdiction.146 Appeals in the enforcing jurisdiction are limited for 
2005 Act cases to issues regarding the recognition process, including filing, 
stays and defenses. Consistently again, appeals under the 2019 Registration Act 
are limited to the registration process. Neither the 2005 Act nor the 2019 
Registration Act address appeals in the enforcing forum, deferring to the 
enforcing state’s law.  
As to appeal timing, the 2005 Act appeals are presumably triggered by 
entry of final judgment recognizing the foreign-country judgment, or a denial. 
Under the 2019 Registration Act, appeals are triggered by the entering of the 
domesticated foreign-country judgment, or the vacating of registration. 
Presumably for both 2005 and 2019 procedures, the enforcing state’s appeal 
timing would run such that the appealing party has, for example, thirty days to 
perfect an appeal under the enforcing state’s law. 
7.  Enforcing the Domesticated Judgment 
After the registered Canadian judgment is domesticated in the enforcing 
state, it is ready for enforcement under the enforcing state’s laws. It is now a 
local judgment subject to all local procedures, including challenges to or appeals 
from collection issues.147  
8.  Relation to the 2005 Act 
Section 9 of the 2019 Registration Act explains that it is a supplement to 
the 2005 Act, all of which applies to registrations except for the 2005 Act’s 
Section 6, which is the requirement of filing a lawsuit in the enforcing state to 
obtain recognition.148 Of course, the 2005 Act remains available for Canadian 
judgments, so the Canadian judgment creditor has a choice between registering 
under the 2019 Registration Act or filing a recognition lawsuit under the 2005 
Act’s Section 6.149 Either is available, but not both.150  
If the Canadian judgment creditor chooses registration but the court vacates 
the registration for noncompliance with registration procedures, then the 
judgment creditor again has a choice—file a new registration if the defect is 
 
 145. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4 cmt. 12 (noting the need to exhaust 
remedies in the rendering forum). 
 146. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 7–8.  
 147. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 5 cmt. 1; see also UNIF. FOREIGN-
COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 6 cmt. 4, 7(2) cmt. 3. 
 148. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 9(a). 
 149. See id. § 9(b). 
 150. See id. § 9(c). 
128 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:99 
curable,151 or file a recognition action under the 2005 Act’s Section 6.152 If the 
enforcing state’s court vacates registration or rules against the judgment creditor 
on any grounds other than non-compliance, that result is likely preclusive of 
further enforcement attempts, at least in that state and possibly other states.153 
C.  DEFERRAL TO THE ENFORCING STATE’S LAW 
Readers should not infer from the enforcement synopsis above that the 
steps provided in the 2019 Registration Act, or the 2005 Act for that matter, 
control the overall enforcement process. Both Acts facilitate the process to an 
extent (with the 2019 Registration Act limited to Canadian money judgments), 
but the enforcing state’s law still determines much of the outcome. Control by 
the enforcing state is not limited to its local law—choice of law rules play a 
significant role, but the enforcing state controls that analysis. 
The role of the enforcing state’s law is best understood by categorizing the 
process. The 2019 Registration Act is limited to the registration process that 
supplants the lawsuit filing required under the 2005 Act. Beyond registration (or 
filing under the 2005 Act), two essential functions remain: (1) the recognition 
standards that will govern if the judgment debtor challenges registration with a 
Petition to Vacate, and (2) execution on the judgment if there is no challenge, or 
if the challenge fails. These functions are included in the dry run synopsis 
immediately above but need further explanation. 
Recognition standards focus, of course, on the rendering state and include 
issues such as jurisdiction and due process. As explained above in the historical 
background, the standards are drawn from common law enforcement and were 
codified first in the 1962 Act, and again in the 2005 Act, to which the 2019 
Registration Act defers.154 Under both the 2005 Act and the 2019 Registration 
Act, the standards are presumed met unless the judgment debtor objects and 
proves noncompliance on at least one standard.155 The 2005 Act addresses the 
recognition standards in some detail but also defers to the enforcing state’s law 
on several fundamental issues. One example of detail versus deferral is the 
judgment debtor’s amenability to the rendering state. The 2005 Act lists six 
examples creating presence-related amenability,156 but then defers to the 
enforcing state’s law for other bases of nonresident amenability.157 Due process 
is an even broader example of deferral, invoked under two standards but leaving 
 
 151. See id. § 9(d)(1). 
 152. See id. § 9(d)(2). 
 153. Under the 1962 Act, a Texas appellate court rejected what it termed “back door” enforcement though 
prior recognition in Louisiana. See Reading & Bates Const. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 
715 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding the Canadian judgment under a 2005 Act filing but rejecting the attempt 
to enforce the Louisiana recognition under full faith and credit). 
 154. See Manco Contracting Co. (W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian, 195 P.3d 604, 608 (2008) (citing 13 pt. II West’s 
U. Laws Ann. (2002) Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, Prefatory Note, p. 40). 
 155. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 7, discussed supra Part II.B.4. 
 156. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005); see also infra 
note 174 and accompanying text.  
 157. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 5(b). 
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its parameters to the enforcing state’s law.158 As further explained in Part III, the 
2005 Act merely sets broad standards on many issues that require definition and 
substance from the enforcing state’s law, all applying to cases registered under 
the 2019 Registration Act.  
Once recognition is accomplished, the now-domesticated judgment is 
enforceable. Even so, questions remain. It may seem a truism to point out that 
foreign judgments, after domestication, are governed by the enforcing state’s 
law. After all, it is no longer foreign but now a local judgment, so local law of 
course controls its execution. That simplification misses the complexity of legal 
issues and leads to the mistaken assumption that enforcement is routine with no 
fundamental differences between enforcing states. To the contrary, the 
enforcement phase reveals significant distinctions between states on 
fundamental issues such as asset susceptibility, privity, and a host of other 
issues. The degree and persistence of these distinctions between states’ 
procedures shows the intensity of local control exercised over asset execution.  
Even if the distinctions are happenstance rather than intentional policy 
differences, it is important for parties—both creditors and debtors—to 
understand that enforcement measures are distinct from recognition (whether it 
is registration or litigation),159 and that distinctions exist between states, both 
foreign and domestic. Although the 2019 Registration Act is limited to the 
registration process, this discussion would be incomplete if it left off at 
registration and ignored the myriad of differing perspectives that follow. They 
are discussed below in Part III. 
III.  THE LARGER JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT SETTING UNDER THE 2005 
ACT 
As noted immediately above, the two foreign judgment Acts in the United 
States—1962 and 2005—leave much to the enforcing state’s law regarding 
recognition and everything regarding enforcement. This section addresses some 
of the issues, particularly governing law, that may arise when enforcing a 
judgment under the 2005 Act or the 2019 Registration Act. It also distinguishes 
a few points that differ when using the 2019 Registration Act instead of the 2005 
Act for a Canadian judgment. Because the 2005 Act is still being considered for 
adoption and has only been used in some states for a few years, most of the cases 
cited in this Article were rendered in a state using the 1962 Act, and some were 
rendered in a state such as Kansas or Mississippi that uses the common law 
enforcement method. Where this Article cites 1962 Act cases, they are identified 
with the parenthetical “(decided under 1962 Act)” but they should be valid for 
the 2005 Act. On the other hand, whether the enforcing Act was 1962 or 2005, 
the law in one state is not necessarily the law in another as illustrated several 
times in the discussion. That is, all points made here depend on variations under 
 
 158. See id. § 4(a)(1), (b)(8). 
 159. To the extent it is not obvious, see Ronald A. Brand, The Continuing Evolution of U.S. Judgments 
Recognition Law, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 277, 336–41 (2017). 
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local law, but this review may give guidance. This summary does not include all 
the nuances but does cover the basic issues in a 2005 Act enforcement.  
A.  SCOPE OF APPLICABILITY 
As discussed in Part II, the 1962 and 2005 Acts apply to foreign-country 
judgments that: (1) award or deny a sum of money; (2) are not directed to taxes, 
fines, penalties or family law; and (3) are final, conclusive and enforceable in 
the rendering country.160 Although litigation can arise on any aspect of the 
scope,161 subject matter disputes require more clarification. That is, the subject 
matter exclusions do not disqualify every such judgment. In family law, for 
example, some judgments award money damages that arose in a support claim 
but were not directed to support and therefore qualify for recognition.162 Similar 
 
 160. The 2005 Act states:  
SECTION 3 APPLICABILITY.  
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), this [act] applies to a foreign-country 
judgment to the extent that the judgment: (1) grants or denies recovery of a sum of money; 
and (2) under the law of the foreign country where rendered is final, conclusive, and 
enforceable.  
(b) This [act] does not apply to a foreign-country judgment, even if the judgment grants or 
denies recovery of a sum of money, to the extent that the judgment is: (1) a judgment for taxes, 
(2) a fine or other penalty; or (3) a judgment for divorce, support, or maintenance, or other 
judgment rendered in connection with domestic relations.  
(c) A party seeking recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the burden of establishing 
that this [act] applies to the foreign-country judgment.  
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 3; see also UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS 
RECOGNITION ACT §§ 1–2 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 1962).  
 161. See DeTray v. AIG Ins. Co. of Can., No. 2:17-CV-0983 RAJ, 2018 WL 4184334, at *6 (W.D. Wash. 
Aug. 31, 2018) (holding that the Canadian court’s declaration of nonliability to Washington resident for accident 
in Washington was not enforceable under Washington’s version of the 2005 Act because it was not for a sum of 
money). 
 162. See Savage v. Zelent, 777 S.E.2d 801, 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that Scottish court’s award 
of attorney fees and costs in failed support claim were within the 2005 Act’s scope) (citing persuasive authority 
from Ohio and New York and cited no contrary authority). The same distinctions occurred under the 1962 Act.  
See Burelle v. Gilbert, 806 N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. Term. 2005) (enforcing a Canadian judgment regarding marital 
property distribution and finding this was not support but equitable property distribution) (decided under 1962 
Act). 
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distinctions occur with fines and penalties.163 The 2019 Registration Act ties into 
the 2005 Act’s scope164 but clarifies on issues such as bankruptcy.165  
B.  JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
Forum competence is a common issue in the cross-border enforcement of 
any judicial order. Competence includes personal jurisdiction (both amenability 
and notice), subject matter jurisdiction, and venue. All three issues matter even 
when challenging competence within one forum. Although venue tends to fade 
in a cross-border analysis, all three are nonetheless considered below as they 
may arise under the 2005 Act or the 2019 Registration Act. There are two 
distinct questions: Was the rendering forum competent? Is the enforcing forum 
competent? It is important to distinguish them either to establish or attack them. 
1.  The Rendering Forum 
The rendering forum’s competence is governed initially by that forum’s 
law, subject to safeguards under Sections 4 and 5 of the 2005 Act. Section 4 of 
the 2005 Act imposes jurisdictional requirements, specifically that no foreign-
country judgment may be enforced unless it satisfies personal jurisdiction166 and 
subject matter jurisdiction.167 Section 5 lists acceptable bases of personal 
jurisdiction along with a catchall allowing the enforcing forum to find other 
acceptable bases. 
a.  Personal Jurisdiction—Amenability and Notice 
Personal jurisdiction is a frequent defense to foreign-country judgments168 
and it is important to note both its components and the proper terminology. 
Personal jurisdiction comprises amenability and notice.169 Amenability is the 
 
 163. See, e.g., L’Institute Nat’l De L’Audiovisuel v. Kultur Int’l Films, Ltd., No. CIV. 11-6309, 2012 WL 
296997, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2012) (holding that French judgment for copyright infringement, obtained by a 
French government agency, was compensatory and not penal) (decided under 1962 Act). See infra notes 262–
267 for further discussion of fines and penalties. 
 164. The 2019 Registration Act states:  
SECTION 3. APPLICABILITY.  
(a) This [act] supplies to a Canadian judgment to the extent the judgment is within the scope 
of [cite to Section 3 of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act].  
(b) A Canadian judgment that grants both recovery of a sum of money and other relief may 
be registered under this [act], but only to the extent of the grant of monetary relief.  
(c) A Canadian judgment regarding both subject matter within the scope of this [act] and 
subject matter not within the scope of this [act] may be registered under this [act], but only to 
the extent the judgment relates to subject matter within the scope of this [act]. 
UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 3 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019). 
 165. See id. § 3 cmt. 1. 
 166. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(2) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005). 
 167. See id. § 4(b)(3). 
 168. Tanya J. Monestier, Whose Law of Personal Jurisdiction? The Choice of Law Problem in the 
Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1729, 1731–32 (2016). 
 169. “Every foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be entitled to any effect, must have been 
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular proceedings, and due notice.” Hilton v. 
Goyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1895). For more recent affirmations regarding foreign judgment recognition, see 
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defendant’s susceptibility to a forum’s assertion of jurisdiction and is governed 
both by the adjudicating forum’s law and a fairness standard.170 Notice is the act 
of notifying defendants of the pending action, and it is also governed by the 
adjudicating forum’s law and a due process or reasonableness standard.171 Both 
elements—amenability and notice—are required to exercise adjudicatory 
jurisdiction.172 That is, a defendant who resides in the forum is still not subject 
to personal jurisdiction until proper notice is served. Similarly, nonresidents who 
receive proper legal notice are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction unless they 
have a sufficient connection to the adjudicating state. Terminology is sometimes 
misapplied in analyzing these two. Although “notice” is generally used in the 
proper context, “amenability” is sometimes discussed synonymously with 
“personal jurisdiction.”173 Whatever terms are used, it’s important to remember 
that both are required.  
(1)  Amenability 
The judgment debtor’s amenability to the rendering forum is of course 
governed initially by that jurisdiction’s law, at least when assessed there. Once 
the foreign judgment is filed or registered in the United States, that earlier 
assertion of personal jurisdiction must comply with Section 5 of the 2005 Act, 
which lists six acceptable grounds for jurisdiction. That is, the enforcing court 
must accept the rendering court’s jurisdiction if it is based on the defendant 
having any one of six acts occur in the rendering jurisdiction: (1) personal 
service; (2) voluntary appearance other than a special appearance; (3) a forum 
clause; (4) domicile, or a business entity’s principal place of business or 
incorporation there; (5) a business office with the claim arising from business 
done there; or (6) operation of a motor vehicle or airplane related to the claim.174  
 
AO Alfa-Bank v. Yakovlev, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 224–25 (2018) (discussing Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti 
Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999)); see also DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 
373, 386 (5th Cir. 2015) (decided under 1962 Act). 
 170. In the United States, the fairness standard comes from constitutional due process. See, e.g., Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 470–72 (1985). In other countries, fairness may be imposed by local 
law, and if not, then by a reasonableness standard under public international law. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 402–04 (AM. L. INST. 2017). In addition, jurisdictional reasonableness 
is collectively imposed by other countries whose courts refuse to recognize judgments rendered without a 
reasonable claim of defendant’s amenability to the forum. 
 171. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950). 
 172. See AO Alfa-Bank, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 224–25 (discussing Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350 regarding 
foreign-country judgment recognition). But see Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse, SA v. Fin. Software Sys., 
Inc., 703 F. App’x 79, 83 (3d Cir. 2017). Personal jurisdiction defense “refers only to the substantive dimensions 
of personal jurisdiction, such as sufficient minimum contacts, and not the technical requirements for service of 
process.” Id. 
 173. See, e.g., EOS Transp. Inc. v. Agri-Source Fuels LLC, 37 So. 3d 349 passim (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(discussing amenability under the larger heading of “personal jurisdiction”) (decided under 1962 Act); accord, 
DeTray v. AIG Ins. Co. of Can., No. 2:17-CV-0983 RAJ, 2018 WL 4184334 passim (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 
2018). 
 174. Section 5 of the 2005 Act reads:  
(a) A foreign-country judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal 
jurisdiction if: (1) the defendant was served with process personally in the foreign country;  
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These six grounds are non-exclusive; the enforcing court may find other 
acceptable grounds, but must accept these six grounds. Other than the examples 
in Section 5, the 2005 Act does not discuss the law of personal jurisdiction or its 
components and instead leaves that to the enforcing state’s law to interpret in 
the recognition process.175 Defendants who have a feasible challenge to the 
rendering forum’s jurisdiction should consider raising that challenge in the 
rendering forum, although many defendants make a tactical choice to wait until 
the resulting judgment is enforced.  
When the question of the rendering forum’s competence reaches the 
enforcing forum, courts have split on what law governs the rendering forum’s 
amenability. Understanding the function of jurisdictional analysis—not only in 
foreign-judgment enforcement but in all jurisdictional settings—requires 
reference to the Supreme Court’s consistent application of a non-formulaic 
approach. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court expressly rejected “any 
talismanic jurisdictional formulas; ‘the facts of each case must [always] be 
weighed’ in determining whether personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair 
play and substantial justice.’”176 Emphasizing further that it was not merely a 
factual determination, but one in which the formula was often vague, the Court 
added that “any inquiry into ‘fair play and substantial justice’ necessarily 
requires determinations ‘in which few answers will be written in black and 
white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are 
innumerable.’”177 The Court was referring of course to the due process test rather 
than a state’s assertion of jurisdiction under its long arm rules. On that point, it 
is important to remember that the due process test does not itself create 
amenability, but merely serves as a limit on the various forum states’ long-arm 
assertions, whose formulae have varied significantly. Amenability, then, is a 
matter of various opinions controlled largely by often differing state and federal 
opinions. 
 
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceeding, other than for the purpose of 
protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceeding or of contesting the 
jurisdiction of the court over the defendant;  
(3) the defendant, before the commencement of the proceeding, had agreed to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter involved;  
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign country when the proceeding was instituted or 
was a corporation or other form of business organization that had its principal place of 
business in, or was organized under the laws of, the foreign country;  
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign country and the proceeding in the foreign 
court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of business done by the 
defendant through that office in the foreign country; or  
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign country and the 
proceeding involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of that operation.]  
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 5 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005).  
 175. See id. § 6 cmt. 4. For criticism of jurisdictional analyses in judgment enforcement, see generally 
Monestier, supra note 168. For examples of jurisdictional issues that can arise, see infra notes 211–228 and 
accompanying text. 
 176. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485–86 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Kulko 
v. Cal. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)). 
 177. Id. at 486 n.29 (quoting Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92). 
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The 2005 Act’s six jurisdictional bases in Section 5(a) should 
accommodate most fact patterns. To allow for the flexibility inherent in 
amenability questions, the 2005 Act’s Section 5(b) also gives the enforcing 
forum the discretion to recognize other jurisdictional bases. Even so, many 
enforcing courts have ignored Section 5(a)’s six bases, even where one or more 
clearly applies, and instead analyzed the rendering forum’s jurisdiction under 
one or more of three laws: (1) the rendering forum’s law,178 (2) the enforcing 
forum’s long-arm law,179 or (3) the due process standard of International Shoe 
and progeny.180 Some courts have applied combinations,181 including all 
three.182 Arguments can be made for any of these, but a review of the 2005 Act 
and preclusion principles should narrow the choices, as explained here:  
(a)  Applying the Rendering Forum’s Law: The 2005 Act is limited to a 
foreign-country judgment that, “under the law of the foreign country where 
rendered, is final, conclusive, and enforceable.”183 At least in countries where 
enforceability required personal jurisdiction, it is clear that the rendering court’s 
law applies to the qualifying determination of personal jurisdiction. But this does 
not mean that the enforcing forum will invariably be analyzing the rendering 
court’s law of jurisdiction. Because of preclusion, the rendering court’s 
amenability law should require analysis in the enforcing forum in only one of 
 
 178. See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (not a default) (applying 
only Nicaraguan law and reversed the rendering court’s finding of jurisdiction and concluding that it had not 
followed Nicaraguan law); see also Naves v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., No. 03-08-00525-CV, 2009 WL 2900755, 
at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2009). In Naves, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected a Brazilian court’s 
jurisdiction to render a default judgment by applying only Brazilian law, relying on the Texas Uniform Foreign 
Money Judgment Recognition Act and sections 36.0044(g) and 36.005(a)(2) of the Texas Civil Practice and 
Remedies Code. Id. at *4. These two cases applied only the rendering court’s jurisdictional rules, but several 
others have applied the rendering court’s law along with International Shoe’s due process standards. E.g., EOS 
Transp. Inc., 37 So. 3d at 354 (decided under 1962 Act) (default in Canada) (enforcing court applied both 
Canadian law and due process in holding that Canada lacked personal jurisdiction).  
 179. See Monks Own Ltd. v. Monastery of Christ in Desert, 142 P.3d 955, 961–62 (N.M. Ct. App.), aff’d, 
168 P.3d 121 (N.M. 2006) (decided under 1962 Act) (default judgment in Ontario) (enforcing court in New 
Mexico applied both the New Mexico long arm statute and due process). 
 180. See Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (explaining that Canadian 
court’s personal jurisdiction over defendant must have been, “at a minimum, in compliance with the 
requirements of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution”), aff’d, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980); Royal Extrusions Ltd. v. Cont’l Window & Glass 
Corp., 812 N.E.2d 554, 558–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (decided under 1962 Act). In Royal Extrusions, the judgment 
debtor objected to Canadian jurisdiction in the original action, then challenged it again when the final Canadian 
judgment was filed for enforcement in Illinois. Id. at 556–57. The Illinois court upheld Canadian jurisdiction 
under Fourteenth Amendment due process, focusing on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286 (1980), Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 462, and Illinois cases applying those principles. Id. at 558–59.  
 181. Perhaps the most common combination is the enforcing court’s long arm statute and due process. See, 
e.g., Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905, 913–17 (N.D. Iowa 2002). A New York court 
applied the rendering court’s law and New York state law but not due process. See Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce v. Saxony Carpet Co., 899 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (decided under 1962 Act). 
 182. See Evans Cabinet Corp. v. Kitchen Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 135, 144–46 (1st Cir. 2010). The case was 
litigated on the merits in Canada and the judgment debtor challenged Canadian jurisdiction in the enforcing 
court, which examined the jurisdictional laws of Quebec, Massachusetts, and federal due process to find a lack 
of jurisdiction. Id. at 140, 144–46. 
 183. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a)(2) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005).   
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three possible circumstances. First, if the judgment debtor objected to 
amenability in the rendering forum (either by special or general appearance) and 
lost the objection, the rendering forum’s decision may be preclusive of any 
further review in the enforcing forum. That is, the enforcing forum should not 
second-guess the rendering forum’s decision about its own law of jurisdiction.184 
Second, if the judgment debtor failed to object in the rendering forum but 
otherwise participated, that failure probably waived any objection to 
amenability, depending on the rendering forum’s law. Once again, the enforcing 
forum should defer to the rendering forum’s application of its law. Third, if the 
judgment debtor failed to participate at all in the rendering forum’s litigation and 
suffered a default judgment, then the amenability issue was not litigated and can 
be raised in the enforcing court. Only the third scenario—default—calls for the 
enforcing court to apply the rendering forum’s amenability law.185 
  (b)  Applying the Enforcing Forum’s Long-Arm Law: Although some 
courts have unquestioningly applied their own amenability law (not including 
due process) to test the power of the rendering court, it is difficult to justify. The 
practice is effectively the internationalization of the forum’s long arm rule, and 
it violates Hilton’s description of the comity appropriate for foreign-country 
judgments.186 Nonetheless, some courts have done that.187 
   (c)  Applying Due Process/Minimum Contacts: If the enforcing court 
chooses to apply a jurisdictional standard other than the six listed in Section 5(a) 
of the 2005 Act, the most appropriate standard is International Shoe’s due 
process test, and that is the choice of most enforcing courts either by itself or 
along with the rendering or enforcing forum’s law. 
In contemplating the new 2019 Registration Act, the drafters anticipated 
that Canadian judgments would seldom rest on exorbitant jurisdictional 
grounds.188 There are, however, several examples of various states rejecting 
Canadian jurisdiction, but not because the Canadian standard was exorbitant.189  
 
 184. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 194 (1985) (quoting Chief Justice John Marshall in Elmendorf v. 
Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159–60 (1825)). But see Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d. 1307, 
1324–26 (S.D. Fla. 2009), which rejected the rendering court’s finding of jurisdiction in a litigated case, almost 
certainly plain error.  
 185. See, e.g., EOS Transp., Inc. v. Agri-Source Fuels LLC, 37 So. 3d 349, 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(decided under 1962 Act); see also Monestier, supra note 168, at 1731–32 (arguing that only the enforcing 
state’s law should determine the rendering court’s jurisdiction).  
 186. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 194.  
 187. See Evans Cabinet, 593 F.3d at 144–46 (applying Quebec law, Massachusetts law, and due process to 
find no jurisdiction in the rendering court); DeJoria v. Maghreb Pretroleum Expl., SA, 804 F.3d 373, 386–89 
(5th Cir. 2015) (applying Moroccan law, Texas law, and due process to uphold the rendering court’s 
jurisdiction).  
 188. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT, Prefatory Note at 3 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 
2019) (“There is a high expectation that Canadian courts ‘will follow procedures comporting with U.S. notions 
of fundamental fairness and jurisdiction . . . .’”). 
 189. See DeTray v. AIG Ins. Co. of Can., No. 2:17-CV-0983 RAJ, 2018 WL 4184334, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 
Aug. 31, 2018); EOS Transp., Inc., 37 So. 3d at 354 (decided under 1962 Act); Att’y Gen. of Can. v. Gorman, 
769 N.Y.S.2d 369, 373–75 (Civ. Ct. 2003) (holding that the judgment creditor failed to offer evidence of 
Canada’s in personam jurisdiction); K & R Robinson Enters. Ltd. v. Asian Exp. Material Supply Co., 178 F.R.D. 
332, 345 (D. Mass. 1998) (decided under 1962 Act). 
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(2)  Notice of the Rendering Forum’s Action 
The 2005 Act addresses notice in several ways. Section (b)(2) forbids 
recognition if the rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction.190 Because 
personal jurisdiction requires both amenability and notice191 it is clear that the 
2005 Act requires notice and forbids recognition without it. The 2005 Act’s due 
process defenses include notice, consistent with the Mullane case.192 In addition 
to Mullane’s basic notice standard, the 2005 Act also imposes the rendering 
country’s notice standard (along with amenability) in its requirement that the 
foreign-country judgment be enforceable under the rendering court’s law.193 In 
addition to these requirements to serve notice, Section 4(c)(1) provides that the 
enforcing court may discretionarily refuse to recognize the foreign-country 
judgment if defendant did not receive notice in time to prepare a defense in the 
rendering forum.194 Finally, Section 5(a)(1) recognizes amenability if the 
judgment debtor was served with process personally in the foreign country. 
In spite of these multiple notice references, the 2005 Act expressly 
mentions notice in the rendering forum only once—Section 4(c)(1), providing a 
discretionary ground for the enforcing court to dismiss if late notice in the 
rendering forum hampered the judgment debtor’s defense there. Critics 
complain that this lack of express references to notice (as opposed to implied 
references in personal jurisdiction, due process, and the rendering court’s law) 
has led courts to misconstrue the notice requirement,195 and it has. Some courts 
have found no notice requirement,196 some have accepted actual notice as 
sufficient,197 and some have imposed the strictest due process standards.198 In 
cases upholding a notice requirement, there is disagreement about which law 
 
 190.  Section 4(b) provides that, “[a] court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment 
if . . . (2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY 
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005). 
 191. The role of notice in creating personal jurisdiction goes back at least to 1869 in Bischhoff v. Wethered.  
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 814 (1869) (holding that an English judgment without notice “was wholly without 
jurisdiction of the person” and “can have no validity here”). Hilton echoed this in stating the prima facie validity 
requirements for foreign-country judgments: “Every foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be entitled 
to any effect, must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular proceedings, 
and due notice.” Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166–67. The Uniform Acts have, of course, not altered this. 
 192. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(b)(1) (due process as a mandatory defense),   
§ 4(c)(8) (giving the enforcing court discretion to reject a judgment rendered in questionable due process 
grounds); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
 193. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a)(2).  
 194. “A court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if: (1) the defendant in the 
proceeding in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the defendant 
to defend . . . .” Id. § 4(c)(1).  
 195. See Monestier, supra note 168, at 1774–83 and sources cited there.  
 196. E.g., Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse, SA v. Fin. Software Sys., 703 F. App’x 79, 83 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 197. See DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 387 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 198. E.g., Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640 F.2d 77, 81 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 
276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928)) (determining that Dutch service of process was mailed to the United States and received 
by the judgment debtor; in spite of that actual notice, the Dutch method was constitutionally inadequate because 
the Dutch service rule did not require the Dutch official to mail the notice, thus failing the reasonably calculated 
requirement). 
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controls notice.199 As with amenability, it is doubtful that Canadian notice 
standards will violate due process although the proceeding in a particular case 
may.200  
(3) Default Judgment in the Rendering Jurisdiction 
A default judgment can implicate both amenability and notice issues. 
Although a default judgment can only be set aside by the rendering forum, the 
judgment debtor may prevent enforcement in the enforcing forum if the default 
judgment’s basis of jurisdiction violates the 2005 Act’s requirements for 
amenability201 or notice.202 Moreover, even though a foreign country default 
judgment would still stand unless set aside where rendered, a collateral attack in 
the enforcing forum may be preclusive on the issue of lack of amenability or 
notice if that issue was not litigated earlier in the rendering forum.  
A foreign default judgment is only a problem under the 2005 Act if it 
becomes final.203 If a final default judgment from a foreign country is filed under 
the 2005 Act, and if the judgment debtor earlier challenged the default in the 
rendering forum, the rendering forum’s decision is preclusive of any challenge 
in the enforcing forum unless the rendering forum’s standard violates the 2005 
Act’s due process safeguard.204  
b.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The 2005 Act blocks enforcement of a foreign-country judgment from a 
court lacking subject matter jurisdiction.205 Unlike its treatment of personal 
jurisdiction, the 2005 Act does not list acceptable bases for foreign subject 
matter jurisdiction and it is obvious that the issue is controlled entirely by the 
rendering forum’s law. If the defendant litigates the issue in the rendering forum, 
 
 199. See Naves v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., No. 03-08-00525-CV, 2009 WL 2900755, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. 
Sept. 10, 2009) (decided under 1962 Act) (applying only Brazilian law in finding lack of notice); Midbrook 
Flowerbulbs Holland B.V. v. Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604, 617 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying only 
Dutch law to uphold notice, holding that American due process doesn’t necessarily control); AO Alfa-Bank v. 
Yakovlev, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 233–36 (Ct. App. 2018) (applying Russian law and the federal due process 
standard); DeJoria, 804 F.3d at 386–87 (decided under 1962 Act) (applying Moroccan law, Texas law, and 
federal due process); Syncrude Can. Ltd. v. Highland Consulting Grp., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626 (D. Md. 
2013) (decided under 1962 Act) (holding that notice under the Hague Convention on Service of Process Abroad 
was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co., v. Robinson Helicopter 
Co., No. 2:06-CV-01798-FMCSSX, 2009 WL 10672970, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2009) (holding that Hague 
service sufficient where it also satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(3)). 
 200. See Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos, 552 N.E.2d 1093, 1097–98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (decided under 1962 Act); 
Isack v. Isack, 733 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (decided under 1962 Act); K & R Robinson Enters. 
Ltd. v. Asian Exp. Material Supply Co., 178 F.R.D. 332, 343 (D. Mass. 1998) (decided under 1962 Act). 
 201. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 
2005). 
 202. See id. § 4(b)(c)(7)–(8). 
 203. Interlocutory defaults are not enforceable under the 2005 Act, see id. § 3(a)(2) (finality requirement), 
or for that matter under the common law. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 passim (1985). 
 204. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1), (c)(7)–(8). 
 205. See id. § 4(b)(3). 
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that decision is preclusive of any collateral attack in the enforcing forum.206 If 
the defendant waits to challenge subject matter jurisdiction until the foreign 
judgment is filed in the United States under the 2005 Act, the rendering forum’s 
law will control that question. The 2019 Registration Act makes no change to 
this and defers entirely to the 2005 Act. 
c.  Venue 
The 2005 Act does not mention venue in the rendering forum, and neither 
does the 2019 Registration Act. As with other rendering-forum validity issues, 
the matter is necessarily controlled by the rendering forum’s law.207 Venue 
issues in the rendering forum are not grounds for objection in the enforcing 
forum. 
2.  The Enforcing Forum 
This Subpart focuses only on the enforcing forum’s jurisdiction.208 The 
guidepost for the enforcing forum’s jurisdiction is found in Section 6, Comment 
4 of the 2005 Act which provides that the judgment creditor’s filing in the 
enforcing forum must comply with all procedural rules in the enforcing forum. 
That is, the 2005 Act contemplates the filing of a new lawsuit that will use a 
summary procedure to domesticate the foreign-country judgment. The 2019 
Registration Act, in comparison, merely requires registration of the foreign-
country judgment which then becomes enforceable if the judgment debtor does 
not raise objections within thirty days.209 In spite of the 2019 Registration Act’s 
use of a registration procedure, the registration must still comply with the 
enforcing forum’s procedure in several regards, as explained below. The overall 
guidepost for both the 2005 Act’s and the 2019 Registration Act’s procedures is 
that the enforcing forum’s law governs questions not otherwise addressed by the 
2005 Act. 
a.  Personal Jurisdiction 
(1)  Amenability  
The 2005 Act does not address amenability and disclaims any intent to do 
so.210 The 2019 Registration Act serves merely as a corollary to the 2005 Act 
and also refrains from addressing amenability in the enforcing state.211 To 
summarize the two Acts’ position on enforcing state amenability, the 2005 Act 
 
 206. See supra notes 184–185 and accompanying text. 
 207. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 cmt. 2 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS ch. 5, topic 3, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1971)).  
 208. For a discussion of challenging the rendering forum’s jurisdiction in the enforcing court, see supra 
notes 176–204 and accompanying text.  
 209. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 5. 
 210. “Nor does this Act address the question of what constitutes a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to 
adjudicate with regard to an action under Section 6.” Id. § 6 cmt. 4.  
 211. The 2019 Registration Act uses the term “jurisdiction” eight times, none in reference to the enforcing 
forum. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).  
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directs that the judgment creditor can implement recognition by filing a new 
lawsuit in the enforcing state212 on which a summary proceeding may be possible 
unless the judgment debtor raises fact issues that require a trial. The 2019 
Registration Act, serving merely as an inset to the 2005 Act, provides a 
registration procedure that circumvents the summary proceeding unless the 
judgment debtor raises objections requiring adjudication. In providing these two 
approaches—filing and registering—the two Acts leave other procedural 
questions to the enforcing state’s law.213 
The enforcing state’s law, then, controls procedural aspects of the foreign 
judgment’s processing, including the requirements for the judgment debtor’s 
amenability there.214 This should be a matter of routine but can raise interesting 
questions, based partly on how we perceive the domestication of foreign-country 
judgments. One view is that domestication is a new lawsuit that the plaintiff 
hopes will lead to a summary judgment based on the preclusive effect of the 
judgment rendered in the foreign country.215 This view, of course, suggests that 
the defendant/judgment debtor be traditionally amenable to the forum state. A 
different view is that domestication is necessarily a summary proceeding 
(assuming the foreign judgment qualifies) based on valid and final litigation 
concluded elsewhere. This second view supports but does not compel the 
conclusion that full-fledged amenability does not apply and instead the only 
issue is the presence of the judgment debtor’s assets.  
Both arguments are plausible, and courts have gone in both directions, 
though not necessarily articulating the bases stated above. This has led to at least 
three positions on the requirement for the judgment debtor’s amenability in the 
enforcing forum. The first is that the judgment debtor must be subject to standard 
amenability under the enforcing forum’s long arm rules and due process.216 The 
second position is that some forms of in rem jurisdiction may be acceptable.217 
 
 212. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6(a). 
 213. “While this Section sets out the ways in which the issue of recognition of a foreign-country judgment 
may be raised, it is not intended to create any new procedure not currently existing in the state or to otherwise 
effect existing state procedural requirements. The parties to an action in which recognition of a foreign-country 
judgment is sought under Section 6 must comply with all state procedural rules with regard to that type of 
action.” Id. §6 cmt. 4.  
 214. See id; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 99 (AM. L. INST. 1971) (local law 
governs enforcement methods). 
 215. Comment 3 of Section 6 of the 2005 Act undermines this view with the statement that, “[a]n action 
seeking recognition of a foreign-country judgment under this Section is an action on the foreign-country 
judgment itself, not an action on the underlying cause of action that gave rise to that judgment.” UNIF. FOREIGN-
COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6 cmt. 3. However, that comment goes on to explain that 
the characterization as a mere action on the judgment means that the defendant cannot relitigate the merits. Id. 
As noted above, comment 4 of Section 6 further provides that the enforcing forum’s law controls procedure and 
jurisdiction for the enforcement action. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.  
 216. See Ronald A. Brand, Federal Judicial Center International Litigation Guide: Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 506 (2013) (discussing Base Metal Trading Ltd. v. 
OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,” 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2002) (decided under 1962 Act)).  
 217. See Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., 677 N.W.2d 874, 878, 885–86 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2003) (decided under 1962 Act) (enforcing court may exercise in personam or in rem jurisdiction, but Michigan 
had neither in this case); Intrigue Shipping, Inc. v. Shipping Assocs., Inc., No. FSTCV135014113S, 2013 WL 
6978815, at *4  (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2013) (decided under 1962 Act) (citing several cases, holding that 
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The third position is that there is no need to establish in personam or in rem 
jurisdiction in the enforcing forum.218 The 2005 Act observes this split of 
authority, noting that the Supreme Court provided a possible basis for in rem 
jurisdiction in its Shaffer v. Heitner opinion.219 Interestingly, the Canadian 
Supreme Court took the third position in 2015.220 
There is no indication that the 2019 Registration Act adopts any of these 
three positions, which is consistent with the 2005 Act’s non-position here. 
Nonetheless, because the 2019 Registration Act removes the requirement of a 
new lawsuit and substitutes a registration procedure that will be clerical in many 
cases, the argument can be made that the 2019 Registration Act is all the more a 
summary proceeding against assets, consistent with any local judgment 
enforcement. How that directs the jurisdictional analysis is for the enforcing 
forum to decide.  
Yet another question is the amenability required for a third-party asset 
holder. The 2005 Act’s jurisdictional defenses refer to “defendant” even though 
in some cases the filing in the United States may be against another party such 
as a garnishee. The 2019 Registration Act acknowledges this with references to 
“the person against whom the judgment is being registered”221 or similar 
phrases. No cases on point were found, but this would seem to be an in rem or 
quasi in rem jurisdictional assertion to be decided under the enforcing state’s 
law. 
 
proof of personal jurisdiction unnecessary and further that judgment creditor alleged presence of assets in 
forum); Electrolines, Inc., 677 N.W.2d at 880 (decided under 1962 Act) (holding that there must be an in 
personam basis if judgment creditor fails to allege presence of property); Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 
202 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977)) (decided 
under 1962 Act) (holding that there is no need for personal jurisdiction in judgment enforcement cases). Note 
that Pure Fishing, Inc. is discussed above for the point requiring the minimum contacts standard for personal 
jurisdiction for rendering courts. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.  
 218. New York courts (following the 1962 Act) have articulated this more than courts in other states. See 
Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (App. Div. 2001) (decided under 1962 Act) (holding 
that no in personam jurisdiction is necessary and no property need be present; often cited for that point), clarified 
in AlbaniaBEG Ambient Sh.p.k. v. Enel S.p.A., 73 N.Y.S.3d 1, 3 (App. Div. 2018) (decided under 1962 Act) 
(holding that if defendant raises objection under the 2005 Act, then enforcing court must have a jurisdictional 
basis, in personam or in rem), further clarified in Diaz v. Galopy Corp. Int’l, N.V., 79 N.Y.S.3d 494, 498 (Sup. 
Ct. 2018) (finding that if no defense raised under the 2005 Act, then no need for any proof of jurisdiction). For 
other states, see Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda) Ltd., 260 S.W.3d 476, 481 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) 
(decided under 1962 Act) (determining that there was no need for in personam or in rem, following Lenchyshyn). 
Accord Beluga Chartering B.V. v. Timber S.A., 294 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App. 2009) (decided under 1962 
Act); see also Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v. Saad Trading, Contracting & Fin. Servs. Co., 986 N.Y.S.2d 
454, 457–58 (App. Div. 2014). 
 219. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6 cmt. 4 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. 
at 210 n.36 (1977) (“Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a 
debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a 
State where the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the 
existence of the debt as an original matter.”)).  
 220. See Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69, paras. 63–77 (Can.). 
 221. E.g., UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(b)(4) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).  
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(2)  Notice in the Enforcing Forum 
Although there are differing theories on amenability in the enforcing 
forum, it is inconceivable that enforcement would not entail sufficient notice. 
The 1962 Act did not provide a filing procedure, which resulted in confusion on 
a few points including notice.222 The 2005 Act clarified the filing procedure with 
a new section specifying that for newly initiated recognition actions, the process 
is commenced “by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country 
judgment.”223 Similarly, a party may raise a foreign judgment in a pending claim 
(for preclusion, offset, or as a distinct enforcement claim) by counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or affirmative defense.224 The comment to Section 6 emphasizes 
that the 2005 Act’s process is a new lawsuit which must comply with all local 
procedures in the enforcing state, and that the Act itself does not create any 
supplemental procedures other than the codifying the common law of 
preclusion.225 The filing of a new action necessarily requires the notice that goes 
with that action under the enforcing state’s law. The success of that 2005 change 
may be measured by the lack of notice cases arising in the adopting states. 
The 2019 Registration Act goes further and provides a distinct notice 
section which requires notice “in the same manner that a summons and 
[complaint] must be served”226 under the 2005 Act. The drafting committee 
considered less notice such as certified mail under the theory that the 2019 
Registration Act is a registration procedure rather than a new lawsuit, and the 
judgment debtor would have already had notice of the foreign judgment. This, 
of course, raised the problem of default judgments in the foreign jurisdiction, 
and the drafting committee could not design an effective means of a distinct 
notice requirement only for foreign defaults. As a result, the drafting committee 
decided to require the same notice as required under the 2005 Act, which is the 
notice given when filing a new lawsuit in the enforcing state. Although the 
terminology may vary, this means a summons or praecipe issued and served 
under the enforcing state’s law. 
In some instances, the 2005 Act or the 2019 Registration Act could be used 
against a party other than the judgment debtor. One example is a garnishment 
action against a bank holding funds for the judgment debtor. Several questions 
arise for this setting, and one is the notice required for the judgment debtor and 
the third-party asset holder. Neither the 2005 Act nor the 2019 Registration Act 
 
 222. Perhaps the most pointed reaction came from a Texas court of appeals which held the Texas version of 
the 1962 Act unconstitutional for its lack of a notice provision. See Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122, 124 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The case did not go to the Texas Supreme Court so there was no immediate opportunity 
to reverse it, but the Texas Supreme Court disapproved of it in Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enters., 
Ltd., pointing out that the 1962 Act implicitly required the filing of a new lawsuit including notice and an 
opportunity to object. 794 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex. 1990). After Docksteader’s initial proceedings, the Texas 
legislature amended its version of the 1962 Act to clarify the procedural steps. Id. at 761 n.1. 
 223. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6(a) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005). 
 224. Id. § 6(b). 
 225. Id. § 6 cmt. 4. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.  
 226. Id. § 6. 
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address this, but it should be clear from both Acts that the enforcing state’s law 
controls. 
(3)  Defaulting in the Enforcing Forum 
This Subpart considers the effect of a default in the enforcing forum, not a 
default in the rendering forum.227 Under the 2005 Act, the judgment creditor is 
pursuing a new claim and has the burden of proving the judgment debtor’s 
obligation by using the foreign-country judgment as preclusive. The judgment 
debtor has the ordinary answer time available under the enforcing state’s law for 
a lawsuit. If the judgment debtor fails to answer, its default would presumably 
concede the judgment creditor’s case, subject to a prove up with other variations 
according to the enforcing state’s law. The 2019 Registration Act does not 
contemplate a new lawsuit but the judgment debtor nonetheless has thirty days 
to respond and raise a defense.228 If the judgment debtor fails to respond, the 
resulting default would immediately implement enforcement. 
b.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the Enforcing Forum 
The 2005 Act implicitly requires that a proper court in the enforcing state 
be used for its instructed process of filing a new lawsuit seeking recognition of 
the foreign-country judgment.229 This necessarily includes an enforcing state’s 
court with subject matter jurisdiction, including the proper amount in 
controversy.230 The Registration Act expressly points to the 2005 Act’s court-
selection requirement.231 If the judgment creditor files or registers in the wrong 
court, not only may the judgment debtor object, but the improper court’s 
resulting actions may be invalidated subject to the enforcing state’s law. 
c.  Venue in the Enforcing Forum 
Neither the 2005 Act nor the 2019 Registration Act address venue at the 
recognition/enforcing stage. Because both Acts emphasize their deference to the 
enforcing state’s law on procedural questions, it should be clear that venue is 
 
 227. For a discussion of default judgments in the rendering forum, see supra notes 201–204 and 
accompanying text. 
 228. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT §§ 5(b), 7 (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019). 
 229. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6(a). If recognition of a foreign-
country judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition shall be raised by filing an action 
seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment. 
 230. See, e.g., Sask. Mut. Ins. Co. v. CE Design, Ltd., 865 F.3d 537, 540–42 (7th Cir. 2017) (filing 
enforcement action in Illinois federal court and court dismissing for lack of diversity jurisdiction). The issue 
may also be the appellate court’s jurisdiction on a timely-filed appeal, as discussed in N.H. Ins. Co. v. Magellan 
Reinsurance Co., No. 02-11-00334-CV, 2013 WL 105654, at *3–5 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013) (decided under 
1962 Act) (acknowledging the need for jurisdiction but finding it existed there).  
 231. Section § 4(a) of the 2019 Registration Act states:  
A person seeking recognition of a Canadian judgment in order to enforce the judgment may 
register the judgment in the office of the [clerk] of a court in which an action for recognition 
of the judgment could be filed under [cite to Section 6 of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act]. 
UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(a). 
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governed for actions under both the 2005 Act and the 2019 Registration Act by 
the enforcing state’s law. Some states have modified their foreign-judgment Act 
to include a venue provision.232 When Texas adopted the 2005 Act in 2017, it 
did not include a venue rule, so its version presumably defaults to Texas’s 
standard venue rules. There are no reported rulings on this question from a state 
applying the 2005 Act. 
The United States’ UEFJA for sister-state judgment enforcement also lacks 
a venue rule for the enforcing state, and that has led some courts to conclude that 
there is no venue rule and the judgment creditor may pursue enforcement in any 
court or district in the enforcing state.233 Other states have interpreted the sister-
state Act’s silence on venue as calling for the general venue rule in those 
states.234 As noted above, there are no reported rulings on enforcing state venue 
under the 2005 Act. Whatever the approach—general venue or venue-free—it is 
up to the enforcing state’s law.  
C.  NON-JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE FOREIGN-COUNTRY JUDGMENT 
Section 4 of the 2005 Act provides two categories of defenses—mandatory 
and discretionary—to the foreign-country judgment’s recognition or 
enforcement. As with many other issues in the 2005 Act, the enforcing court 
must decide whether the objection is sufficient to justify rejection of the foreign-
country judgment. 
1.  Mandatory Grounds for Dismissal 
The mandatory dismissal grounds in Section 4(b) are that the rendering 
forum (1) was part of a judicial system “that does not provide impartial tribunals 
or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;”235 (2) 
 
 232. See, for example, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.0041, requiring filing in “the county of 
residence of the party against whom recognition is sought or in any other court of competent jurisdiction as 
allowed under the Texas venue laws.” Id. (repealed 2017).  
 233. See L & R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 533–36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011) (determining that 
there was no venue requirement for sister-state judgment registrations in Colorado, reasoning that a judgment 
enforcement under full faith and credit is not an “action” under Colorado venue law). 
 234. See Garrett v. Okla. Panhandle State Univ., 156 P.3d 48, 50–51 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Cherwood, 
Inc. v. Marlin Leasing Corp., 601 S.E.2d 356, 357–58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Cantu v. Howard S. Grossman, P.A., 
251 S.W.3d 731, 737–38, 741–42 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). 
 235. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §4(b)(1) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2005). 
Note that this mandatory ground requires the judgment debtor to show that the foreign legal system lacks 
impartiality or due process in its entirety and not just in that particular case. See DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum 
Expl., SA, 804 F.3d 373, 382 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the judgment debtor failed to prove that the Moroccan 
system was deficient as a whole). Contrast this with the discretionary ground under section 4(c)(7) of the 2005 
Act which focuses only on the foreign judgment at issue. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS 
RECOGNITION § 4(c)(7). Revolution or war has been a successful argument that the foreign judicial system was 
defective. See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2000), in which the court declined to 
recognize a Liberian judgment rendered during the Liberian Civil War, noting that “Liberia’s judicial system 
was in a state of disarray and the provisions of the Constitution concerning the judiciary were no longer 
followed.” Id. at 138; see also Harris Corp. v. Nat’l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1357 (11th Cir. 
1982) (‘‘[T]he Islamic regime now governing Iran has shown a deep hostility toward the United States and its 
citizens, thus making effective access to the Iranian courts unlikely.’’); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 
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lacked personal jurisdiction;236 or (3) lacked subject matter jurisdiction.237 The 
jurisdictional issues are discussed above.238 As to impartial tribunals, the 
judgment debtor must show that the failing exists with the entire judicial system 
as a whole as opposed to the events occurring in that particular case.239 Few 
countries are found to meet this low standard, and never Canada. 
2.  Discretionary Grounds for Dismissal 
Section 4(c) lists eight discretionary grounds for rejecting the foreign-
country judgment. They are (1) lack of notice of the foreign proceeding “in 
sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend”;240 (2) “the judgment was 
obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to 
present its case”;241 (3) “the judgment or underlying claim is repugnant to the 
public policy of this state or of the United States”;242 (4) “the judgment conflicts 
 
1411–13 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce Iranian judgment and concluding that the Iranian judicial system 
did not comport with due process). At the other extreme, the mere lack of American litigation opportunities is 
often an unsuccessful challenge. See Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(finding the English system acceptable even though it lacks the United States concept of pre-trial discovery); 
Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2002); Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 
680, 688 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 236. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(2).  
 237. Id. § 4(b)(3).  
 238. See supra notes 166–204 and accompanying text (personal jurisdiction), 205–206 and accompanying 
text (subject matter jurisdiction). 
 239. See Bank Melli Iran, 58 F.3d at 1410, 1413 (decided under 1962 Act). In contrast, section 4(c)(7)–(8) 
of the 2005 Act provide discretionary grounds based on a lack of due process or doubting the rendering court’s 
integrity in a particular case. See infra note 246 and accompanying text (referencing DeJoria v. Maghreb 
Petroleum Expl., S.A., 935 F.3d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 2019)).  
 240. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(1).  
 241. Id. § 4(c)(2). 
 242. Id. § 4(c)(3). In general, the public policy defense is difficult to prevail on. See Allianz Suisse 
Versicherungs-Gesellschaft v. Miller, 24 F. Supp. 3d 670, 676–79 (W.D. Mich. 2014) (explaining the difficult 
standard while holding that a Swiss judgment for hockey injuries sustained in Switzerland did not violate the 
enforcing state’s public policy). Among other limits, a mere difference in law is insufficient. See UNIF. FOREIGN-
COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 cmt. 8. That the difference concerns fundamental rights 
in the United States may not be enough. See Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1013 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the emotional distress judgment in Japan against church did not violate religion clause under 
California or United States law). On the other hand, the defense sometimes works when invoking rights less than 
religious freedom. See Aguerre v. Schering-Plough Corp., 924 A.2d 571, 582 (N.J. App. Div. 2007) (decided 
under 1962 Act) (ruling in favor of judgment debtors’ public policy defense based on their objection that the 
Argentine judgment that violated the rights of whistle blowers). A North Carolina court explained public policy 
based on the 2005 Act’s definition: “Public policy is violated only if recognition of the foreign-country judgment 
would tend clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, or the public confidence in the administration 
of the law, or would undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of 
private property, which any citizen ought to feel.” Savage v. Zelent, 777 S.E.2d 801, 809 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) 
(quoting the North Carolina version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Recognition Act, North Carolina General 
Statutes section 1C-1853(c)(3) cmt. 8, consistent with the 2005 Act section 4 cmt. 8) (denying judgment debtor’s 
public policy challenge to a Scottish judgment for attorney fees and costs). As a mostly common law jurisdiction, 
Canadian judgments will be even less likely to be refused on public policy grounds, but it has happened. See 
Jaffe v. Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 584, 598 (4th Cir. 2002) (decided under 1962 Act). Jaffe was a 
Canadian default judgment against a bail bond company and its agents for kidnapping plaintiff. Virginia refused 
to enforce the Canadian judgment because a Florida court (where it was originally brought for enforcement) 
refused to give it recognition. Id. Florida would not recognize the Canadian judgment because doing so would 
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with another final and conclusive judgment”;243 (5) “the proceeding in the 
foreign court was contrary to forum agreement between the parties”;244 (6) “in 
the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a 
seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action”;245 (7) “substantial doubt 
about the rendering court’s integrity with respect to the judgment”;246 or (8) “the 
specific proceeding in the foreign court was not compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law.”247 Several of these eight discretionary 
grounds have no reported decisions. That does not mean the challenges are not 
raised, but merely that they did not result in case law. 
D.  GOVERNING LAW BEYOND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Choice of law rules in the United States are more court-made than 
legislative and tend to be governed by state and not federal law.248 This state law 
dominance is subject to a few constitutionally compelled exceptions. The only 
one relevant here is the due process requirement that the chosen law be 
reasonably related to the dispute.249 If the United States ratifies the new Hague 
Judgments Convention, it is possible that Congress will federalize foreign-
country judgment enforcement, which may change some of the governing law 
points noted below. In the current arrangement, whether the judgment creditor 
 
contravene Florida’s public policy which promotes the apprehending of fugitives. Id. The most notable public 
policy issue between the United States and Canada concerns Canadian defamation judgments which would be 
barred in the United States by the First Amendment. In reaction to such judgments from Canada and other 
countries, Congress enacted the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage 
(SPEECH) Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101 et seq, and Canadian case law provided some of the motivation. See, e.g., 
Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. V. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2013). Even without the federal statute, it is 
likely the public policy grounds in the 2005 Act would be grounds to reject the foreign defamation judgments. 
Just to be sure, three states have amended their foreign-country judgment acts to provide an extra defense against 
defamation judgments rendered in foreign countries. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1725 (2019) (effective Jan. 1, 
2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 718A (2015) (effective Nov. 1, 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.6055 (2019) (effective 
July 1, 2009) (amending its version of the 1962 Act). The amendments do not appear to be from a uniform or 
standardized statute. 
 243. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(4). 
 244. Id. § 4(c)(5); see, e.g., Montebueno Mkt., Inc. v. Del Monte Corp-USA, 570 Fed. App’x 675, 676 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (denying recognition based on violation of arbitration clause designating the Philippines). 
 245. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(6). 
 246. Id. § 4(c)(7). Note the difference between the 2005 Act’s section 5(a)(1) defense of impartial tribunal 
(which looks to the foreign country’s system as a whole), and sections 5(c)(7) and (8) (which look only to the 
particular proceedings leading to the judgment in question). See DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 935 
F.3d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 247. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(8). Under state and federal 
law in the United States, due process entails many specific rights in litigation. But when applied to foreign-
country judgments, the due process concept does not guarantee those same rights and instead assures 
fundamental fairness. See Midbrook Flowerbulbs Holland B.V. v. Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604, 
615–16 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that Dutch court’s discovery rulings did not render the Dutch judgment 
fundamentally unfair).    
 248. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938). When federal courts have attempted to craft 
choice of law rules for diversity cases, calling it a function of federal common law, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly reversed those courts and redirected them to the local state’s choice of law rule. E.g., Day & 
Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4–5 (1975).  
 249. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410–11 (1930). 
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uses a state or federal court to enforce a foreign-country judgment, the choice of 
law calculus will be drawn from the enforcing state’s rule.  
Choice of law rules are also overwhelmingly directed to substantive legal 
issues. Because most of the enforcement issues are procedural, even when 
involving two countries, it is a general rule that the rendering jurisdiction’s law 
will control most issues up to the point of filing under the 2005 Act, or 
registering under the 2019 Registration Act, and the enforcing jurisdiction’s law 
will control most questions in the enforcing jurisdiction from that point.250 That 
approach will get most answers correct, but not all.  
  1.  In the Rendering Court  
The most puzzling choice of law questions will arise in the enforcing court. 
The governing law decisions made in the rendering court will typically concern 
the merits of the initial case, and those decisions must be litigated and then 
appealed in the rendering jurisdiction. Once that initial judgment is final, the 
choice of law decisions made there are generally unassailable.251  
One possible exception is legislative jurisdiction. That is, if the rendering 
court chooses a law (including its own) that lacks a reasonable connection to the 
dispute, then the judgment debtor may have an objection in the enforcing court 
under the enforcing forum’s public policy or jurisdictional standards.252 This 
could be true even if the judgment debtor argued and lost the point in the 
rendering jurisdiction, if the rendering jurisdiction failed to apply the correct 
reasonableness standard followed in the United States. There are no known 
examples of the rendering forum’s choice of law decisions being challenged in 
the enforcing court. To be clear, there are several cases challenging the fairness 
of the law applied in the rendering court,253 but not because the law lacked a 
reasonable connection to the dispute. If the rendering court had personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant/judgment debtor, it very likely has legislative 
jurisdiction, at least to the extent of applying its own substantive law. 
2.  In the Enforcing Court 
Once again, the forum’s choice of law rule applies, subject to due process 
(legislative jurisdiction) limits.254  
a.  Forum Clauses 
Forum clause disputes will of course relate to the rendering forum’s 
jurisdiction because parties do not draft forum clauses for judgment 
 
 250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (AM. L. INST. 1971) (explaining that local law 
governs enforcement methods).  
 251. Reconsidering the rendering forum’s choice of law decisions would be relitigating the original case. 
See supra notes 136–140 and accompanying text. 
 252. The United States Supreme Court recognized the due process limitation on choice of law in Home Ins. 
Co., 281 U.S. at 411, and later cases. See generally HAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 157–66.  
 253. See infra notes 290–297 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement. The Author, at least, has never heard of one. But even though the 
forum clause dispute will focus on the rendering forum, the dispute can occur in 
the enforcing forum in two distinct scenarios: First, the judgment debtor may 
object to amenability in the rendering court under Section 4(b)(2) of the 2005 
Act, a mandatory grounds for dismissal in the enforcing court. This is an 
example of a prorogating clause—one that supports (or is argued as supporting) 
the plaintiff’s choice of forum.  
Second, the judgment debtor may object under the 2005 Act’s section 
4(c)(5) that the judgment creditor’s original filing in the rendering court was 
contrary to the parties’ forum clause designation of another place. That is called 
a derogating clause—one that undermines plaintiff’s choice of forum—and it’s 
a discretionary ground for dismissal. 
In both instances—prorogating and derogating clauses—if the issue was 
litigated in the rendering court, then the results there are likely preclusive of any 
reconsideration in the enforcing court. Additionally, if the judgment debtor 
participated in the rendering forum long enough to submit to the jurisdiction but 
failed to object to a prorogating clause or assert their rights under the derogating 
clause, then the issue is likely waived. But if the judgment debtor defaulted, then 
the forum clause issue can be raised in the enforcing forum, and that brings up 
the choice of law issue. 
For both categories—prorogating and derogating—the enforcing court will 
have to consider the clause’s validity, interpretation, and ultimately its 
enforceability.255 Those questions are difficult enough in routine litigation. The 
choice of law permutations are too complex to address briefly here but are 
conceptually more difficult when two forums are involved, and the second is 
analyzing the first’s jurisdiction based on a forum clause that one jurisdiction 
may accept and the other may not. The fallback rule may be that the enforcing 
forum’s choice of law rule should control as to all three issues—validation, 
interpretation, and enforceability. 
These potential complexities often go unnoticed. In a typical foreign-
judgment-enforcement case involving forum clauses, the court does not engage 
in a complex choice of law analysis.256 That simple approach is justified in most 
cases because the court applies the forum’s choice of law without objection. The 
only foreign-judgment case found involving a detailed choice of law analysis of 
a forum clause is from a federal court in Kansas, a common law state that has 
 
 255. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 62–64 (2013); James P. George, Forum 
Clauses at the Margin, 71 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 333–49 (2019). 
 256. See Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (decided under 1962 Act) (enforcing 
Australian judgment because forum clause did not deprive Australia of jurisdiction); Courage Co. v. Chemshare 
Corp., 93 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (decided under 1962 Act) (denying enforcement of Japanese 
judgment in deference to arbitration clause); Montebueno Mktg., Inc. v. Del Monte Corp.-USA, 570 Fed. App’x 
675, 677 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying enforcement of Philippine judgment based on contract arbitration clause, no 
analysis of clause); Iraq Middle Mkt. Dev. Found. v. Harmoosh, 848 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 2017) (decided 
under 1962 Act) (enforcing an Iraqi judgment over forum clause objection because judgment debtor waived 
right to arbitration by voluntarily participating in the foreign litigation; applying forum law with no analysis of 
the clause itself). 
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never adopted either of the Uniform Acts regarding foreign-country 
judgments.257 In spite of that sole Kansas case, forum clauses are potential 
trouble spots in 2005 Act cases. 
b.  Classifying the Foreign Judgment as Within the 2005 Act’s Scope 
What law governs the characterization of the Canadian judgment in regard 
to its coming within the scope of the 2019 Registration Act? Claims and 
remedies sometimes have differing interpretations from one jurisdiction to 
another. Although the rendering court’s law labels a dispute one way, the 
enforcing court’s law may see it another way. The difference does not matter if 
the claim’s altered label is nonetheless covered by the 2019 Registration Act, 
but if the re-defined claim or remedy falls outside the 2019 Registration Act’s 
scope, then the foreign-country judgment will not qualify for the 2005 Act or the 
2019 Registration Act.258 Interestingly, the foreign claim or remedy is at that 
point controlled by the enforcing state’s law because the question is whether the 
foreign-country judgment falls within the scope of the enforcing state’s version 
of the 2005 Act.  
Because the 2005 Act’s scope excludes domestic relations judgments,259 
those cases sometimes provide examples for claim re-labeling. In a Scottish 
court, Julie Zelent sued Alan Savage for support after their relationship failed. 
Zelent lost her case and the court awarded Savage £148,516.75 in attorney fees 
and costs.260 Savage filed the resulting Scottish judgment in North Carolina 
which upheld it, applying North Carolina law to characterize the Scottish 
judgment as one for attorney fees (a sum of money) and not for support or 
alimony.261  
An example of remedy re-labeling is the judgment debtor’s challenge of a 
damage award as a fine or penalty which falls outside the 2005 Act’s scope.262 
In De Fontbrune v. Wofsy,263 a 2001 French judgment awarded de Fontbrune 
damages for Wofsy’s copyright infringement in reprinting Picasso’s work. The 
French court also imposed a sanction, or astreinte, of €10,000 for each future 
violation. Ten years later de Fontbrune brought another French action to enforce 
the 2001 astreinte, and this time won two million euros for Wofsy’s multiple 
violations. When de Fontbrune sought enforcement in California, Wofsy 
 
 257. See Herr Indus., Inc. v. CTI Sys., SA, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1178 (D. Kan. 2015) (common law 
recognition) (applying an Atlantic Marine analysis as to validity, interpretation and enforcement).  
 258. Common law preclusion may be an option as long as the redefined claim or remedy does not violate 
the enforcing state’s public policy. See supra notes 2–15 and accompanying text. 
 259. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(b)(3) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 
2005); see also UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019) 
(linking the 2019 Registration Act’s scope to that of the 2005 Act). 
 260. See Savage v. Zelent, 777 S.E.2d 801, 803–04 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
 261. Id. at 804–07 (citing similar holdings from Ohio and New York).  
 262. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(b)(2); see also UNIF. 
REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 3(a) (linking the 2019 Registration Act’s scope to that 
of the 2005 Act).  
 263. De Fontbrune v. Wofsy, 838 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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objected that the astreinte was a penalty or fine and therefore uncollectible.264 
The lower court agreed and dismissed the enforcement action but the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. In determining that the astreinte was merely a judgment for a 
sum of money and not a penalty, the court of appeals applied California law to 
characterize the astreinte’s function, but was influenced by French law’s 
description as an enforcement of a private right and not a public sanction.265  
To the extent the labeling question involves arguments about penalties, the 
enforcing forum’s law is likely to dominate because the old common law rule 
rejected penalties from other jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the common law rule 
itself calls for an examination of the foreign law’s purpose, as done in the de 
Fontbrune case.266 Apart from the penalty label, foreign judgments are also 
objected to as excessive and thus violating public policy, although the challenge 
is difficult to maintain.267  
As shown in the examples above, damages challenges are often piecemeal, 
attacking only one portion of the judgment such as punitive damages or some 
other line item. The 2005 Act addresses mixed judgments and line-item 
challenges with its “to the extent” language.268 In spite of that language, at least 
one court has questioned whether recognition under the 2005 Act permits line-
item damages challenge.269 The 2019 Registration Act further emphasizes the 
ability to enforce only portions of a mixed judgment (aiding the judgment 
creditor) and also facilitates challenges (aiding the judgment debtor) by 
 
 264. Id. at 995. 
 265. Id. at 1000–06. 
 266. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) is the definitive common law statement about penalties in 
the United States. In Huntington, the Supreme Court drew from United States case law, English case law, and 
Blackstone’s Commentaries to come up with the following definition.  
 The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects may be called penal, is a 
penal law in the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, 
depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offence against the public 
justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act. 
Huntington, 146 U.S. at 673–74. Huntington is still invoked in judgment enforcement cases including those 
under the 2005 Act. E.g., De Fontbrune, 838 F.3d at 1001; L’Institute Nat’l de L’Audiovisuel v. Kultur Int’l 
Films, Ltd., No. CIV. 11-6309, 2012 WL 296997, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2012) (finding that French judgment was 
remedial and not penal); Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d 321, 323–24 (Mass. 1992) (finding 
that Canadian damages were remedial rather than a penalty); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F. 
Supp. 73, 75 (D. Mass. 1987) (finding that Belgian damages from civil case but related to criminal activity were 
remedial and not penal); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 89, 89 cmt. d, 98, 120 cmt. 
d (AM. L. INST. 1971).  
 267. See, e.g., Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 711–12 (Tex. 
App. 1998) (enforcing Canadian judgment over objections that the Canadian court’s measure of damages for 
patent infringement was excessive and violated public policy). 
 268. Section 3(a) of the 2005 Act that the Act applies “to the extent that the judgment: (1) grants or denies 
recovery of a sum of money; and (2) under the law of the foreign country where rendered, is final, conclusive, 
and enforceable.” UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a). Section 3(b) repeats 
this in its exclusion of certain judgments, stating that the Act does not apply “to the extent that the judgment is: 
(1) a judgment for taxes; (2) a fine or other penalty; or (3) a judgment for divorce, support, or maintenance, or 
other judgment rendered in connection with domestic relations”). Id. § 3(b). 
 269. “We find no authority for the proposition that the circuit court can pick and choose the portions of a 
foreign court’s order that will be recognized and enforced.” CE Design Ltd. v. HealthCraft Prods., Inc., 79 
N.E.3d 325, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).  
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requiring the judgment creditor to designate which portions of the foreign-
country judgment are being pursued in the enforcing forum.270  
c.  Finality in the Rendering Jurisdiction 
Judgment finality is a basis for disqualifying the foreign-country 
judgment.271 Although the issue would seemingly be governed by the rendering 
jurisdiction’s law, arguments sometimes arise when the enforcing forum’s 
definition of finality differs from that in the rendering forum. A common ground 
for the differing definitions is the effect of appeal on finality—does appeal 
postpone enforcement, or must the judgment debtor post a bond pending the 
appeal’s outcome? 
Those differing views apply only to a jurisdiction’s internal treatment of its 
own judgments, but what happens when the jurisdiction is assessing a judgment 
from another jurisdiction? In the United States, full faith and credit requires that 
states give sister-state judgments the same effect they have in the rendering 
state.272 Should that view apply to foreign-country judgments? The California 
Supreme Court offered a thorough discussion in Manco Contracting Co. 
(W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian273 in which it disapproved of a California Court of Appeals 
opinion that applied California’s finality definition to a Korean judgment. The 
Manco court held the rendering jurisdiction’s law controlled finality in the 
enforcing court, and noted that to its knowledge no other court in the United 
States had reached the same conclusion as that in Korea Water.274 
d.  Authentication or Certification of the Foreign Judgment  
The 2005 Act states only that, “A party seeking recognition of a foreign-
country judgment has the burden of establishing that this [act] applies to the 
foreign-country judgment.”275 The 2019 Registration Act at least implies, if not 
directs, that the rendering jurisdiction’s law (Canadian federal or provincial) 
controls authentication (or certification).276 This seems to be a settled issue and 
no case law disputes this.  
e.  What Assets Are Subject to Execution 
Related to damages objections, another question is what assets are subject 
to execution in the enforcing state after the foreign judgment is domesticated. 
 
 270. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(b)(4) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).  
 271. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a)(2), cmt. 3 (limiting the 
Act’s scope to final judgments).  
 272. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 
380 (1985).  
 273. Manco Contracting Co. (W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian, 195 P.3d 604 (Cal. 2008). 
 274. Id. at 611 (citing several consistent holdings from other states); see also Nicholas v. Env’t Sys. (Int’l) 
Ltd., 499 S.W.3d 888, 898–900 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that rendering state’s law controls finality).  
 275. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(c). 
 276. The 2019 Registration Act provides that, “[a] registration under subsection (a) must include: (1) a copy 
of the Canadian judgment authenticated as accurate by the court that entered the judgment.” UNIF. REGISTRATION 
OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(b)(1). 
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The convenient (and perhaps wrong) answer is that the enforcing jurisdiction’s 
law governs enforcement procedures, including asset susceptibility. Logic 
suggests that the enforcing state’s law would govern which assets are subject to 
execution because at that point, the judgment has been domesticated in the 
enforcing state. The Washington Supreme Court saw it differently in Shanghai 
Commercial Bank Limited v. Kung Da Chang.277 In that case, Chang defaulted 
on loan to Shanghai Commercial Bank in Hong Kong. The bank obtained a $9 
million judgment from a Hong Kong court, then sought to enforce it in Chang’s 
home state—Washington—and sought collection against Chang’s marital 
property. That is, the bank filed against both husband and wife, where the wife 
had not been a party to the loan, was not in the lawsuit, and may not have been 
subject to Hong Kong jurisdiction. The Changs objected in the Washington 
court, pointing out that Washington law barred enforcement against the marital 
property in these circumstances. But the marital property was a proper target 
under Hong Kong law. The Washington Supreme Court held that Hong Kong 
law governed based on the loan’s choice of law clause (and again, she was not a 
party to that agreement) and the court’s finding that Hong Kong had the most 
significant relationship to the issue.278 In spite of this Washington result, there 
should be valid arguments for asset susceptibility to be a question purely of the 
enforcing state’s law. Those arguments’ validity may vary with the facts of 
particular cases (such as party status or whether the asset was pledged as 
security), but otherwise it is difficult to see asset execution—an in rem 
procedure—as anything other than a local law question. 
Yet another variation is what assets are subject to provisional remedies in 
the enforcing court pending the foreign judgment’s domestication. The 2005 Act 
does not address this, again because that Act requires the filing of a lawsuit and 
litigation, even if summary. That lawsuit’s status as local litigation almost 
certainly means that the enforcing state’s law governs provisional remedies. The 
answer is the same with the 2019 Registration Act, but perhaps with a twist. The 
2019 Registration Act speeds up domestication by presuming the Canadian 
judgment to be enforceable though subject to a thirty-day waiting period for the 
judgment debtor to raise defenses.279 Because of this quicker finality, the 2019 
Registration Act bars the use of provisional remedies that dispose of the 
judgment debtor’s property, but allows remedies under the enforcing state’s law 
that secure the property.280 If the judgment creditor seeks to place a lien on the 
judgment debtor’s property, what law governs exemption? The express answer 
in the 2019 Registration Act is that the enforcing state’s law governs,281 but it’s 
conceivable that Canadian law could be pertinent, especially where corporate 
assets are at issue. 
 
 277. Shanghai Com. Bank Ltd. v. Chang, 404 P.3d 62 (Wash. 2017).  
 278. Id. at 65–70. 
 279. See UNIF. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 5.  
 280. See id. 
 281. See id. § 5(b). 
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f.  Privity with the Judgment Debtor—Who Is Subject to Execution? 
Judgments may also be enforced in many cases against non-parties such as 
successors in interest or asset holders such as banks. The 2005 Act does not 
address privity with the judgment debtor because that issue requires addressing 
in the litigation to domesticate the foreign-country judgment. The 2019 
Registration Act, however, directs enforcement as to “the person against whom 
recognition of the judgment through registration is sought”282 and “[a] person 
against whom a Canadian judgment has been registered.”283 This creates the 
possibility of filing against someone not named in the Canadian judgment. To 
the extent the 2019 Registration Act allows filing against an alleged asset holder, 
various arguments could be made about what law defines privity. The few cases 
that have addressed this have split between the rendering forum’s law284 and the 
enforcing forum’s law.285  
g.  Interest 
In discussing judgment interest, both in this Article and with the enforcing 
court, it is important to distinguish prejudgment and post-judgment interest. 
Prejudgment interest is awarded as compensable damages in the final judgment 
and will be subsumed in the judgment award. Once that foreign judgment 
reaches the enforcing court, any question of the prejudgment interest will not be 
subject to challenge because of the proscription on relitigating the merits. It 
could be said that if the subject does arise, it should be governed by the rendering 
jurisdiction’s law, but that point is unnecessary because the issue has been 
finally decided.286  
Post-judgment interest consists of the rate awarded in the final judgment 
and the effective date from which it runs. Just as the prejudgment interest rate is 
not subject to re-litigation, so should the rendering court’s award of post-
 
 282. Id. § 6(a). 
 283. Id. § 7(a).  
 284. See Johnson v. Ventra Grp., Inc., 191 F.3d 732, 738–39 (6th Cir. 1999). Johnson obtained a judgment 
in Ontario against Canadian company Manutec for breach of an employment contract. Id. at 737. After that, 
Manutec went through corporate reorganization and became Ventra, which in a prior structure had been 
Manutec’s parent. Id. Johnson filed his Canadian judgment in a Michigan state court, and Ventra removed it to 
federal court. Id. To collect, Johnson had to prove that as a matter of Canadian law, Ventra was liable as successor 
to Manutec’s assets. Id. at 737–38. The trial court ruled against Johnson on this and the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed. See id. at 738, 750. 
 285. See United Steelworkers, Local 1-1000 v. Forestply Indus., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 798, 802–03 (W.D. 
Mich. 2010). Canadian judgment in favor of Canadian labor union and against Michigan-based steel company, 
for violation of collective bargaining in Canada. Id. at 799–800. The Canadian judgment included damages 
against Forestply and one officer/owner, but when the union filed in Michigan for enforcement, Forestply was 
insolvent. Id. The union then sought enforcement against two of Forestply’s principals who were not named in 
the Canadian judgment. Id. at 801. The enforcing court allowed this but required a trial to determine the new 
defendants’ status as principals. Id. at 807. 
 286. In Sw. Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramón, the enforcing court found that a Mexican judgment on a 
promissory note with a forty-eight percent prejudgment interest rate did not violate Texas public policy and 
precluded relitigation in Texas. 169 F.3d 317, 319, 322–23 (5th. Cir. 1999). 
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judgment interest be a precluded issue unless the judgment debtor can persuade 
the enforcing court that it violates public policy.287  
Although post-judgment interest is generally not re-litigable in regard to 
the original award, it is subject both to calculation and change in the enforcing 
court because of (1) the interest accrued after rendering but before filing in the 
enforcing court, and (2) the interest accrued in the enforcing jurisdiction after 
domestication. As with other enforcement procedures, this is a matter of the 
enforcing court’s law. Although the 2005 Act does not address post-judgment 
interest,288 the 2019 Registration Act does in Section 4(b)(6)(A), limited to 
requiring the judgment creditor to list the interest rate awarded in the rendering 
court, the effective date, and the portions of the judgment to which it applies. 
Other issues are up to the enforcing jurisdiction’s law. Logic suggests that the 
enforcing court would calculate the post-judgment interest accrued under the 
rendering jurisdiction’s law (from issuance up to the date of domestication in the 
enforcing jurisdiction), then include that amount in the new domesticated 
judgment, and impose an appropriate post-judgment rate under the enforcing 
state’s law.289  
h.  Evaluating Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Impartiality 
Foreign-country judgment enforcement under both comity and the 
Uniform Acts is replete with due process references and its synonyms. In stating 
the common law standard, Hilton used terms like “full and fair trial,” “regular 
proceedings,” and “impartial administration of justice,”290 rather than due 
process, perhaps to avoid confusion with the United States meaning. The 2005 
Act, however, uses “due process” as the basis for a mandatory and a 
discretionary dismissal grounds. Section 4(b)(1) requires dismissal if the 
enforcing court finds that the rendering court’s judicial system as a whole lacked 
impartial tribunals or used procedures incompatible with due process.291 Section 
4(c)(8) allows discretionary dismissal if the specific proceeding (rather than the 
system in general) violated due process.292  
In contemplating an enforcement or a defense, it is important to note that 
the due process concept in the 2005 Act is not limited to familiar standards under 
state or federal law in the United States. Although many (but not all) enforcing 
 
 287. See Hyundai Sec. Co. v. Lee, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 271–73 (Ct. App. 2015) (finding that the Korean 
court’s post-judgment interest rate of twenty percent did not violate California public policy). 
 288. See generally UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. L. CMM’N 
2005). There was no need because the 2005 Act’s requirement of filing a new lawsuit which, if successful, 
produced a new local judgment. Id. § 7 cmt. 3. The 2019 Registration Act, in contrast, simply registers and 
domesticates the Canadian judgment unless judgment debtor raises an appropriate challenge. UNIF. 
REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENT ACT § 4(b)(6)(A) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 2019).   
 289. In Hyundai Sec., the California court did exactly that, holding that the twenty percent Korean rate 
would run from the date of the Korean judgment up to the date of domestication in California, and after that, the 
California post-judgment rate of ten percent would be used. Hyundai Sec., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 273. 
 290. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895). 
 291. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1). 
 292. See id. § 4(c)(8). 
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courts use the United States due process standard to assess amenability and 
notice in the rendering court,293 other challenges to the foreign process should 
be measured by a broader assessment. Specifically, for challenges under 
Sections 4(b)(1), 4(c)(7), and 4(c)(8), the question is whether the foreign 
proceeding conformed to what the Seventh Circuit has termed the “international 
concept of due process.”294 As a comment the 2005 Act notes: “Procedural 
differences, such as absence of jury trial or different evidentiary rules are not 
sufficient to justify denying recognition under subsection (b)(1), so long as the 
essential elements of impartial administration and basic procedural fairness have 
been provided in the foreign proceeding.”295 The case law applying these elusive 
standards do not exercise a choice of law as such, but instead conduct an 
assessment of basic fairness.296 Although United States law may inform the due 
process and fairness analysis, it should not define it. And while the standard is 
vague, due process objections do prevail in some cases.297 
i.  Superseding Law in the Enforcing Court: Federal and 
International 
The enforcing court’s local law will govern most aspects of enforcement 
but in some cases will be superseded by federal law or even international law. 
One example of federal law is the SPEECH Act298 which Congress passed in 
2010 in response to defamation judgments from foreign courts based on 
statements made in the United States. Statements intentionally and originally 
placed on the internet are often the source of the foreign court’s jurisdictional 
assertion,299 but in one case a Canadian plaintiff based it on her ability to 
download a book from the internet.300 SPEECH is an acronym for Securing the 
Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act,301 
which is also known as the Libel Tourism Act. Under the SPEECH Act, a 
judgment creditor with a foreign defamation judgment must show that the 
foreign law offers at least as much protection for speech as that protected by our 
First Amendment and resulting case law. Three states have amended their 
foreign-country money judgment Acts to provide extra defense against 
defamation judgments rendered in foreign countries. Two states—California and 
 
 293. See supra notes 178–187 and accompanying text. 
 294. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 295. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 cmt. 5.  
 296. See Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477. 
 297. See DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 935 F.3d 381, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2019) (declining a 
Moroccan judgment); Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining a Liberian 
judgment rendered during the Liberian Civil War). 
 298. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 4101–05 (2018). 
 299. See Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 483–84, 496 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Nova 
Scotia defamation judgment regarding statements made on a website based in Mississippi). 
 300. See Pontigon v. Lord, 340 S.W.3d 315, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting an Ontario defamation 
judgment arising from a book written in Missouri which the Canadian judgment creditor was able to download 
on her computer). 
 301. 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–05.  
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Oklahoma—amended their versions of the 2005 Act302 and Florida amended its 
1962 Act.303 The amendments do not appear to be from a uniform or 
standardized statute. 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act304 is another example. The FSIA 
applies to both state and federal courts for any claim filed against a foreign state 
as defined in the Act.305 It governs the immunity of foreign countries and their 
subsidiaries,306 and in doing so addresses personal jurisdiction, service of 
process, governing law for the underlying claim, and subject matter jurisdiction 
if the claim is filed in federal court. The FSIA is premised on claims filed 
originally in a court in the United States, but by its wording also applies to 
assertions of judicial jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign for judgment 
execution purposes.307 If a Canadian court renders a judgment against a foreign 
sovereign and the judgment creditor then attempts to enforce it under the 2019 
Registration Act, the filing in the enforcing state (state or federal court) would 
have to comply with the FSIA. Several enforcing courts have applied the FSIA 
to recognitions under the 1962 Act or the 2005 Act, generally without question 
as to the FSIA’s applicability. There have been four 2005 Act cases in the past 
two years, all in the District of Columbia.308 An interesting question is whether 
the FSIA governs or at least assesses the rendering court’s jurisdiction. In 
Commissions Import Export, S.A. v. Republic of Congo, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that it did.309 
If the United States signs on to the new Hague Judgments Conventions310 
(or any other judgments treaty), it will preempt any inconsistent aspects of state 
enforcement law, although the Convention appears compatible with both the 
2005 Act and the 2019 Registration Act.311 In addition, if the United States 
eventually ratifies the Hague Choice of Court Convention,312 the 2019 
Registration Act may inform contested issues on forum clauses in establishing 
 
 302. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1725 (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 718A (2015). 
 303. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.6055 (2019). 
 304. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–11. 
 305. See id. § 1603. 
 306. See id. § 1603(b). 
 307. See id. § 1610 (referring to execution “upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a 
State”). 
 308. See Comm’ns Imp. Exp., S.A. v. Republic of the Congo, 118 F. Supp. 3d 220 (D.D.C. 2018); BCB 
Holdings Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 232 F. Supp. 3d 28 (D.D.C. 2017); Cont’l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed. 
Gov’t of Nigeria, 603 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015); SACE S.p.A. v. Republic of Para., 243 F. Supp. 3d 21 
(D.D.C. 2017). 
 309. See Comm’ns Imp., 118 F. Supp. 3d at 226–28. 
 310. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, supra note 37. 
 311. Id. at art. 13 (“The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or registration for 
enforcement, and the enforcement of the judgment, are governed by the law of the requested State unless this 
Convention provides otherwise.”); see also id. at art. 15 (allowing for alternative enforcement under national 
law). 
 312. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 33. 
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the rendering court’s jurisdiction, or in challenging that jurisdiction if it 
conflicted with the parties otherwise valid choice.313 
Apart from possible treaty application, customary international law has 
applicable provisions even though they are less likely to be used by enforcing 
courts. Specifically, customary international law echoes the due process clause’s 
requirement that personal jurisdiction and choice of law (legislative jurisdiction) 
be based on a reasonable connection between the parties, the dispute, and the 
forum.314  
Other issues can arise inside or outside the terms of the 2019 Registration 
Act. As to which law governs, the default rule should be that the enforcing state’s 
law governs, either through its local law regarding judgment enforcement or 
through its conflict of laws rule. 
E.  PARALLEL AND COLLATERAL LITIGATION 
A conflicting judgment is a defense to recognition under the 2005 Act, and 
accordingly to registration under the 2019 Registration Act.315 There are no 
reported cases raising that defense, but parallel or collateral litigation can affect 
enforcement in other ways. With any parallel (that is, coinciding) litigation, the 
first lawsuit to final judgment will have whatever preclusive effect is appropriate 
against the remaining lawsuit or lawsuits.316 
Otter Valley Foods, Inc, v. Aliki Foods, LLC,317 involved parallel litigation 
in Connecticut and Ontario regarding frozen food products. Otter Valley was a 
Canadian manufacturer of frozen food products and had various contracts with 
Aliki, a Connecticut marketer of frozen foods. In 2005, the parties renegotiated 
their agreement so that Aliki could pay down its accumulated debt to Otter. Then 
in 2007, Otter shipped contaminated food to Aliki which had to be recalled. Aliki 
sued Otter in federal court in Connecticut, and Otter then sued Aliki in Ontario 
for breaching the 2005 agreement.318 The Ontario case was first to judgment, 
and Otter filed for recognition in Connecticut. Aliki defended on grounds that 
Otter’s claim was (1) repugnant to public policy because of the attorney fees 
based on English law, (2) a compulsory counterclaim which required filing in 
the Connecticut action (which still had not reached final judgment), and (3) 
subject to a set-off from the Connecticut action.319 The enforcing Connecticut 
 
 313. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing section 4(c)(5) of the 2005 Act). 
 314. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402–04 (AM. L. 
INST. 1987). 
 315. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(4) (UNIF. L. CMM’N 
2005).  
 316. See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1877) (addressing both claim and issue 
preclusion); see also HAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 1376–84. 
 317. Otter Valley Foods, Inc. v. Aliki Foods, LLC, No. CV094009931, 2010 WL 2573760 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. May 21, 2010). 
 318. See id. at *1. 
 319. See id. at *2–3. 
November 2020] MONEY JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT 157 
court disagreed with all three defenses and ordered recognition of the Canadian 
judgment.320  
Otter Valley was only a two-lawsuit dispute. Kitchens Intern., Inc. v. Evans 
Cabinet Corp., Ltd.,321 was a drawn-out dispute in Quebec, Georgia, New York, 
and New Jersey regarding breach of contract. Kitchens obtained a Canadian 
judgment and sought to enforce it in the United States and preclude Evans’s 
parallel U.S. actions. Evans objected to the Canadian judgment on personal 
jurisdiction grounds.322 The New Jersey trial court upheld the Canadian 
judgment but the court of appeals reversed, citing the federal action in the First 
Circuit where Evans’s personal jurisdiction objection was pending, and noting 
that the Canadian judgment was not conclusive.323  
Parallel cases may also be filed as declaratory judgment actions to be used 
preclusively against an action on the merits. CE Design Ltd. v. HealthCraft 
Products, Inc.324 is an example where a party—ING Insurance Company—used 
Illinois’s version of the 1962 Act to gain recognition of its Canadian declaratory 
judgment to preclude liability incurred by a policy holder. The dispute started 
when CE Design obtained a judgment against Healthcraft in Illinois, then took 
an assignment of Healthcraft’s insurance rights against ING Insurance Co., an 
Ontario corporation. Meanwhile, ING filed an action in Canada seeking a 
declaration that it had no duty to defend Healthcraft.325 When CE Design used 
its assignment from Healthcraft to sue ING in Illinois, ING responded by filing 
its Canadian declaratory judgment which led to the dismissal of Healthcraft’s 
claim.326 
Collateral litigation, filed after the foreign judgment is filed in the 
enforcing state, is another variation. Drake v. Brady327 involved two default 
judgments from Canadian small claims courts against two Minnesota couples 
for unpaid bills to a Canadian resort, Northern Outpost (Brady). The judgment 
creditor filed the two Canadian defaults in two Minnesota counties against the 
respective couples. The couples then sued the resort in a separate Minnesota 
court for deceptive trade practices and a declaration of the Canadian judgments’ 
unenforceability.328 The Minnesota trial court (the collateral attack court, not the 
enforcing court) dismissed the judgment debtors’ declaratory judgment claim 
for legal inadequacies, and found it had no jurisdiction over the Canadian 
defendants for the deceptive trade claims.329 The Minnesota appellate court 
 
 320. See id. at *3–4. 
 321. Kitchens Int’l, Inc. v. Evans Cabinet Corp., 993 A.2d 252 (N.J. App. Div. 2010). 
 322. Id. at 253–56. 
 323. Id. at 256–58 (referring to Evans Cabinet Corp. v. Kitchen Int’l, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D. Mass. 
2008), rev’d, 593 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2010)) (stating that fact issues regarding personal jurisdiction precluded 
summary judgment). 
 324. CE Design Ltd. v. HealthCraft Prods., Inc., 79 N.E.3d 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). 
 325. See id. at 327–29. 
 326. See id. at 329–33. 
 327. Drake v. Brady, No. A08-2137, 2009 WL 2928157, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009).  
 328. See id. at *1. 
 329. See id. 
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affirmed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action but reversed regarding 
Minnesota jurisdiction over the Canadian parties on the deceptive trade claim.330 
The court remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the judgment 
creditor’s preclusion claim (based on the Canadian judgments), which the trial 
court had not addressed because of the jurisdictional dismissal.331  
Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar Group, Inc.332 is an example of using 
a federal court for a collateral attack raising federal public policy. 
Investorshub.com is a website based in the United States, which posted 
derogatory comments about Mina Mar Group, based in Ontario with a subsidiary 
in Texas. Mina Mar obtained an Ontario default judgment against Investorshub 
and other defendants which it then filed in a Florida state court.333 In response, 
Investorshub sued in federal court seeking a declaration that the Canadian 
judgment was unenforceable under the SPEECH Act and under the Florida 
version of the 1962 Act.334 During the pre-trial phase, Mina Mar conceded and 
the court entered the declaratory judgment as a consent decree.335 This was an 
effective use of a federal collateral attack, but unnecessary because the defense 
could have been raised in the Florida state court.  
CONCLUSION AND SPECULATIONS 
The 2019 Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act offers a new 
level of efficiency for civil money judgment enforcement between Canada and 
the United States. Rather than a stand-alone statute, it supplements the 2005 
Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act. But unlike the 
2005 Act’s requiring “filing an action seeking recognition,” the 2019 
Registration Act presumes the Canadian judgment’s enforceability and avoids 
litigation unless the judgment debtor raises a defense.  
That efficiency does not short-circuit due process safeguards. The 2019 
Registration Act requires detailed information that both assists the court and 
protects the judgment debtor. That detail—ranging from judgment 
authentication to an accounting of the amount and interest already collected—
replicates the prima facie proof required in any summary judicial proceeding for 
enforcement. Notice is also crucial. Where the 2005 Act implicitly requires 
notice with the filing of a recognition lawsuit, the 2019 Registration Act 
expressly requires both detailed information at the outset and service consistent 
with the enforcing state’s rules for new lawsuit. In addition, the registering 
attorney must attest to the judgment’s propriety, an express declaration of 
validity as opposed to the imputed claim validity when filing an enforcing 
lawsuit. 
 
 330. See id. at *2–5. 
 331. See id. at *6. 
 332. Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar Grp., Inc., No. 4:11CV9-RH/WS, 2011 WL 12506239 (N.D. Fla. 
June 20, 2011). 
 333. See id. at *1–2. 
 334. See id. at *2. 
 335. See id. at *3. 
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Proper registration and completed notice trigger a thirty-day waiting period 
after which the judgment is enforceable under local law unless the judgment 
debtor files a petition to vacate. Stays are not automatic but available upon a 
showing of likelihood of success. The concern that foregoing litigation exposes 
people to invalid judgments fails to consider that the current lawsuit process 
typically allows only thirty days to respond before default.  
The registration process is a balance of efficiency and detail that aids the 
court and protects the judgment debtor. Matched with its Canadian counterpart, 
money judgment enforcement between Canada and the United States will be 
shortened (by months in some cases), and costs reduced, without sacrificing the 
judgment debtor’s defenses.  
So what’s next? If the registration process is viable for Canadian 
judgments, what does it offer for other foreign-judgment enforcement in the 
United States, or for that matter between other countries? It is tempting to argue 
that this registration process provides a model for wider use, and that may be. If 
the concern is the filing of questionable or even fraudulent judgments from any 
given country, that can be done now under the 2005 Act. As the 2019 
Registration Act does for Canadian judgments, a wider registration process 
would retain all the defenses and protection of the 2005 Act along with more 
detailed filing and notice requirements.  
That’s the argument for wider use but it’s not realistic, at least not yet. The 
reason is that governments are inherently resistant to commands—executive, 
legislative, or judicial—from other governments. This resistance exists even 
between polities in the same system. In the United States, for example, we 
needed constitutional compulsion for interstate judgment recognition, and even 
then states resist.336 That inherent resistance to external judgments is not only 
about the application process (such as registration), but the very idea of 
domesticating foreign adjudication. A primary issue, then, is not so much 
registration as it is recognition—what makes a foreign judgment acceptable for 
domestication? Registration and other cross-border efficiencies won’t occur 
without consensus on recognition standards. 
That’s not to say that consensus on recognition is operationally necessary 
for a registration process to work. It’s just to say that without recognition 
consensus, the comfort level with registration won’t be there. The 2019 Hague 
Judgments Convention,337 focused on recognition standards and deferring to 
signatories for the recognition process (for example, registration or litigation), 
appears to be a good vehicle to pursue that consensus widely. But consensus 
need not be universal. Smaller groups—two, for example—can benefit as well. 
The group may be defined by a common legal history, culture, trade, or location, 
and it’s notable that all four factors are true of Canada and the United States. 
 
 336. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236–38 (1908) (finding that full faith and credit required 
Mississippi to enforce Missouri judgment that violated Mississippi public policy); see also HAY ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 1406–12 (discussing later cases). 
 337. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, supra note 37. 
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Wherever that alignment on recognition occurs, that group will be poised to 
consider changing the application process to registration.338  
In achieving agreement, it may be important to limit consensus to 
recognition standards and defer to the enforcing state’s local law on some 
fundamental concepts as well as the enforcement process. Although the use of 
local law for much of enforcement is obvious and difficult to imagine otherwise, 
the point is not its use but the sharp distinctions among states on a wide variety 
of fundamental issues, including some involving international standards. These 
polar differences, many discussed in Part III, can encourage forum shopping by 
creditors and asset hiding by debtors. This is not to propose that states abandon 
local control, but merely that greater harmonization on key issues would benefit 
predictable judgment enforcement. Local control and local distinctions are 
understandable in light of the inherent in rem nature of executing against local 
assets, but greater alignment on crucial issues could lead to comprehensive 
judgment conventions. But we are not there yet, even for sister-state 
enforcement in the United States.339 
Even without more alignment in the enforcing stage, we will see a growing 
harmonization of judgment recognition standards, emanating from the 2019 
Hague Judgments Convention or elsewhere. That standardization will in turn 
lead to emphasis on more efficient application processes, and the 2019 











 338. While a comparative study beyond Canada and the United States is outside this Article’s scope, the 
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IV.  APPENDICES 
A.   THE UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION 
ACT (2005) 
UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY  
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT340 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the [Uniform 
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act]. 
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]: 
(1) “Foreign country” means a government other than: 
(A) the United States; 
(B) a state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the 
United States; or 
(C) any other government with regard to which the decision in this state as 
to whether to recognize a judgment of that government’s courts is initially 
subject to determination under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United 
States Constitution.  
(2) “Foreign-country judgment” means a judgment of a court of a foreign 
country. 
SECTION 3. APPLICABILITY. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), this [act] applies to a 
foreign-country judgment to the extent that the judgment: 
(1) grants or denies recovery of a sum of money; and 
(2) under the law of the foreign country where rendered, is final, 
conclusive, and enforceable. 
 
 340. Copyright © 2005 By National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
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(b) This [act] does not apply to a foreign-country judgment, even if the 
judgment grants or denies recovery of a sum of money, to the extent that the 
judgment is: 
(1) a judgment for taxes; 
(2) a fine or other penalty; or 
(3) a judgment for divorce, support, or maintenance, or other judgment 
rendered in connection with domestic relations. 
(c) A party seeking recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the 
burden of 
establishing that this [act] applies to the foreign-country judgment.  
SECTION 4. STANDARDS FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN-
COUNTRY 
JUDGMENT. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), a court of this 
state shall recognize a foreign-country judgment to which this [act] applies. 
(b) A court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment if: 
(1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due 
process of law; 
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; 
or 
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
(c) A court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if: 
(1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not receive 
notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend; 
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an 
adequate opportunity to present its case; 
(3) the judgment or the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the 
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United 
States; 
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; 
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement 
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be determined 
otherwise than by proceedings in that foreign court; 
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign 
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action; 
(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt 
about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment; or 
(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was 
not compatible with the requirements of due process of law. 
(d) A party resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the 
burden of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition stated in subsection (b) 
or (c) exists. 
SECTION 5. PERSONAL JURISDICTION. 
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(a) A foreign-country judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of 
personal jurisdiction if: 
(1) the defendant was served with process personally in the foreign 
country; 
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceeding, other than for the 
purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the 
proceeding or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant; 
(3) the defendant, before the commencement of the proceeding, had agreed 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject matter 
involved; 
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign country when the 
proceeding was instituted or was a corporation or other form of business 
organization that had its principal place of business in, or was organized under 
the laws of, the foreign country; 
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign country and the 
proceeding in the foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] 
arising out of business done by the defendant through that office in the foreign 
country; or 
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign 
country and the proceeding involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising 
out of that operation. 
(b) The list of bases for personal jurisdiction in subsection (a) is not 
exclusive. 
The courts of this state may recognize bases of personal jurisdiction other 
than those listed in 
subsection(a) as sufficient to support a foreign-country judgment. 
SECTION 6. PROCEDURE FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN-
COUNTRY JUDGMENT. 
(a) If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought as an original 
matter, the issue of recognition shall be raised by filing an action seeking 
recognition of the foreign-country judgment. 
(b) If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought in a pending 
action, the issue of recognition may be raised by counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
affirmative defense.  
SECTION 7. EFFECT OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN-
COUNTRY JUDGMENT. If the court in a proceeding under Section 6 finds 
that the foreign-country judgment is entitled to recognition under this [act] then, 
to the extent that the foreign-country judgment grants or denies recovery of a 
sum of money, the foreign-country judgment is: 
(1) conclusive between the parties to the same extent as the judgment of a 
sister state entitled to full faith and credit in this state would be conclusive; and 
(2) enforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as a judgment 
rendered 
in this state. 
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SECTION 8. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL OF 
FOREIGNCOUNTRY JUDGMENT. If a party establishes that an appeal 
from a foreign-country judgment is pending or will be taken, the court may stay 
any proceedings with regard to the foreign-country judgment until the appeal is 
concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the appellant has had sufficient time 
to prosecute the appeal and has failed to do so. 
SECTION 9. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. An action to recognize a 
foreign-country judgment must be commenced within the earlier of the time 
during which the foreign-country judgment is effective in the foreign country or 
15 years from the date that the foreign-country judgment became effective in the 
foreign country.  
SECTION 10. UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION. In applying 
and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to 
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states 
that enact it. 
SECTION 11. SAVING CLAUSE. This [act] does not prevent the 
recognition under principles of comity or otherwise of a foreign-country 
judgment not within the scope of this [act]. 
SECTION 12. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
[(a) This [act] takes effect … . 
[(b) This [act] applies to all actions commenced on or after the effective 
date of 
this [act] in which the issue of recognition of a foreign-country judgment 
is raised.] 
SECTION 13. REPEAL. The following [acts] are repealed: 
(a) Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 
(b) 
B.   THE UNIFORM REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT 
(2019) 
UNIFORM REGISTRATION OF 
CANADIAN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT341 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Uniform 
Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act. 
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]: 
(1) “Canada” means the sovereign nation of Canada and its provinces and 
territories. “Canadian” has a corresponding meaning. 
(2) “Canadian judgment” means a judgment of a court of Canada, other 
than a judgment that recognizes the judgment of another foreign country. 
SECTION 3. APPLICABILITY. 
(a) This [act] applies to a Canadian judgment to the extent the judgment is 
within the scope of [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act Section 3], if 
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recognition of the judgment is sought to enforce the judgment. 
(b) A Canadian judgment that grants both recovery of a sum of money and 
other relief 
may be registered under this [act], but only to the extent of the grant of 
recovery of a sum of 
money. 
(c) A Canadian judgment regarding subject matter both within and not 
within the scope 
of this [act] may be registered under this [act], but only to the extent the 
judgment is with regard 
to subject matter within the scope of this [act] 
SECTION 4. REGISTRATION OF CANADIAN JUDGMENT. 
(a) A person seeking recognition of a Canadian judgment described in 
Section 3 to 
enforce the judgment may register the judgment in the office of the [clerk] 
of a court in which an 
action for recognition of the judgment could be filed under [cite to Uniform 
Foreign-Country 
Money Judgments Recognition Act Section 6]. 
(b) A registration under subsection (a) must be executed by the person 
registering the 
judgment or the person’s attorney and include: 
(1) a copy of the Canadian judgment authenticated [under [cite to state’s 
law on authentication of a foreign-country judgment]] [in the same manner as a 
copy of a foreign 
judgment is authenticated in an action under [cite to Uniform Foreign-
Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act Section 6]] as an accurate copy by the court 
that entered the 
judgment; 
(2) the name and address of the person registering the judgment; 
(3) if the person registering the judgment is not the person in whose favor 
the judgment was rendered, a statement describing the interest the person 
registering the judgment has in the judgment which entitles the person to seek 
its recognition and enforcement; 
(4) the name and last-known address of the person against whom the 
judgment is being registered; 
(5) if the judgment is of the type described in Section 3(b) or (c), a 
description of the part of the judgment being registered; 
(6) the amount of the judgment or part of the judgment being registered, 
identifying: 
 (A) the amount of interest accrued as of the date of registration on the 
judgment or part of the judgment being registered, the rate of interest, the part 
of the judgment to which interest applies, and the date when interest began to 
accrue; 
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 (B) costs and expenses included in the judgment or part of the judgment 
being registered, other than an amount awarded for attorney’s fees; and 
 (C) the amount of an award of attorney’s fees included in the judgment 
or part of the judgment being registered; 
(7) the amount, as of the date of registration, of post-judgment costs, 
expenses, and attorney’s fees claimed by the person registering the judgment or 
part of the judgment; 
(8) the amount of the judgment or part of the judgment being registered 
which has been satisfied as of the date of registration; 
(9) a statement that: 
 (A) the judgment is final, conclusive, and enforceable under the law of 
the Canadian jurisdiction in which it was rendered; 
 (B) the judgment or part of the judgment being registered is within the 
scope of this [act]; and 
 (C) if a part of the judgment is being registered, the amounts stated in the 
registration under paragraphs (6), (7), and (8) relate to the part; 
(10) if the judgment is not in English, a certified translation of the judgment 
into English; and 
(11) [a registration fee of $[____]] [the registration fee stated in [cite to 
applicable statute or administrative rule]]. 
(c) On receipt of a registration that includes the documents, information, 
and registration fee required by subsection (b), the [clerk] shall file the 
registration, assign a [registration] docket 
number, and enter the Canadian judgment in the court’s [registration] 
docket. 
(d) A registration substantially in the following form complies with the 
registration requirements under subsection (b) if the registration includes the 
attachments specified in the form: 
SECTION 5. EFFECT OF REGISTRATION. 
(a) Subject to subsection (b), a Canadian judgment registered under Section 
4 has the same effect provided in [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act Section 7] for a judgment a court determines to be 
entitled to recognition. 
(b) A Canadian judgment registered under Section 4 may not be enforced 
by sale or other 
disposition of property, or by seizure of property or [garnishment] [trustee 
process], until 31 days 
after notice under Section 6 of registration is served. The court for cause 
may provide for a 
shorter or longer time. This subsection does not preclude use of relief 
available under law of this 
state other than this [act] to prevent dissipation, disposition, or removal of 
property 
SECTION 6. NOTICE OF REGISTRATION. 
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(a) A person that registers a Canadian judgment under Section 4 shall cause 
notice of registration to be served on the person against whom the judgment has 
been registered. 
(b) Notice under this section must be served in the same manner that a 
summons and 
[complaint] must be served in an action seeking recognition under [cite to 
Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act Section 6] of a 
foreign-country money judgment. 
(c) Notice under this section must include: 
(1) the date of registration and court in which the judgment was registered; 
(2) the [registration] docket number assigned to the registration; 
(3) the name and address of: 
 (A) the person registering the judgment; and 
 (B) the person’s attorney, if any; 
(4) a copy of the registration, including the documents required under 
Section 4(b); and 
(5) a statement that: 
 (A) the person against whom the judgment has been registered, not later 
than 30 days after the date of service of notice, may [petition] the court to vacate 
the registration; and 
 (B) the court for cause may provide for a shorter or longer time. 
(d) Proof of service of notice under this section must be filed with the 
[clerk] of the court 
SECTION 7. [PETITION] TO VACATE REGISTRATION. 
(a) Not later than 30 days after notice under Section 6 is served, the person 
against whom the judgment was registered may [petition] the court to vacate the 
registration. The court for cause may provide for a shorter or longer time for 
filing the [petition]. 
(b) A [petition] under this section may assert only: 
(1) a ground that could be asserted to deny recognition of the judgment 
under [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act]; or 
(2) a failure to comply with a requirement of this [act] for registration of 
the judgment. 
(c) A [petition] filed under this section does not itself stay enforcement of 
the registered 
judgment. 
(d) If the court grants a [petition] under this section, the registration is 
vacated, and any act under the registration to enforce the registered judgment is 
void. 
(e) If the court grants a [petition] under this section on a ground under 
subsection (b)(1), the court also shall render a [judgment] denying recognition 
of the Canadian judgment. A [judgment] rendered under this subsection has the 
same effect as a [judgment] denying recognition to a judgment on the same 
ground under [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition 
Act]. 
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SECTION 8. STAY OF ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT 
PENDING DETERMINATION OF [PETITION]. A person that files a 
[petition] under Section 7(a) to vacate registration of a Canadian judgment may 
request the court to stay enforcement of the judgment pending determination of 
the [petition]. The court shall grant the stay if the person establishes a likelihood 
of success on the merits with regard to a ground listed in Section 7(b) for 
vacating a registration. The court may require the person to provide security in 
an amount determined by the court as a condition of granting the stay  
SECTION 9. RELATIONSHIP TO UNIFORM FOREIGN-
COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT. 
(a) This [act] supplements [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act] and that [act], other than [cite to Uniform Foreign-
Country Money Judgments Recognition Act Section 6], applies to a registration 
under this [act]. 
(b) A person may seek recognition of a Canadian judgment described in 
Section 3 either: 
(1) by registration under this [act]; or 
(2) under [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition 
Act 
Section 6]. 
(c) Subject to subsection (d), a person may not seek recognition in this state 
of the same judgment or part of a judgment described in Section 3(b) or (c) with 
regard to the same person 
under both this [act] and [cite to Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act 
Section 6]. 
(d) If the court grants a [petition] to vacate a registration solely on a ground 
under Section 
7(b)(2), the person seeking registration may: 
(1) if the defect in the registration can be cured, file a new registration under 
this 
[act]; or 
(2) seek recognition of the judgment under [cite to Uniform Foreign-
Country Money Judgments Recognition Act Section 6]. 
SECTION 10. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND 
INTERPRETATION. In applying and construing this uniform act, 
consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with 
respect to its subject matter among states that enact it. 
SECTION 11. TRANSITIONAL PROVISION. This [act] applies to the 
registration of a Canadian judgment entered in a proceeding that is commenced 
in Canada on or after [the effective date of this [act]]. 
SECTION 12. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [act] takes effect …. 
 
 
 
